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The Standard View

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The Standard View

In philosophy, the standard view refers to the opinion that a true belief entails justified knowledge. Subsequently, for a belief or truth to be dispensed, it is fundamental to be based on knowledge. Richard Feldman uses the standard view in his discussion on knowledge and rationality (Irfankhawaja, 2017). Subsequently, the standard view can establish people’s diverse opinions about the past and the future in mathematics and science. Feldman outlines that the standard view stipulates that knowledge combines a person’s perception, memory, reasoning, introspection, and rational insight (Irfankhawaja, 2017). As a result, Feldman’s reference to standard view is made based on what most people believe and not the proclamations in philosophy. Furthermore, Feldman’s opinion on the standard view is based on the opinion that individual beliefs can be justified (Irfankhawaja, 2017). Thus, Feldman’s approach to the standard view puts into consideration similar justified beliefs among people.

Although the standard view asserts that there are justifiable beliefs, philosophical skeptics doubt certain assertions of knowledge in diverse sectors. Thus, skepticism is a problem to the standard view as it introduces opposition to the already highlighted beliefs (Williams, 2017). There are diverse arguments outlined by philosophical skeptics, such as the possibility of error, indistinguishability, certainty, and transmissibility. The possibility of error argument is the best opinion against skepticism (Williams, 2017). It asserts that people’s beliefs about the external world could be mistaken, making the beliefs not knowledge. At the same time, the indistinguishability argument is the worst argument against skepticism. It stipulates that people’s knowledge can be based on fallible evidence, limiting the distinguishability from the non-knowledge facts (Williams, 2017). On the contrary, certainty is the best argument for skepticism as it asserts that no person is usually certain of anything. Transmissibility is the worst argument made in favor of skepticism as it asserts that a person doesn’t know since they are not brains in a vat. Therefore, the diverse skepticism arguments have diverse opinions that support or oppose the concept of the standard view.

References

Irfankhawaja, J. (2017, August 21). The standard view in philosophy. The Institute for Objectivist Studies. Retrieved November 25, 2021, from https://instituteforobjectiviststudies.wordpress.com/2017/08/21/the-standard-view-in-philosophy/.

Williams, M. (2017). Skepticism. The Blackwell guide to epistemology, 33-69. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781405164863.ch1

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