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PUBLIC AND CULTURAL DIPLOMACY; LESSONS FROM THE COLD WAR
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Public and cultural diplomacy; Lessons from the Cold War
Given the threats of disinformation and the digital revolution in the current information age, the government needs reliable and effective public diplomacy (PD) and national outreach policies now than ever before. More to being essential to the national security, effective public diplomacy will advance the government’s interests in the international community. Luckily, the appropriateness and reliability of the US public and cultural diplomacy have been tried many times in the past, particularly during the Cold War era. The success and failures of the US public and cultural diplomacy in the cold war create insightful knowledge that can help the US in its interventional measures against the contemporary disinformation threats. This paper reviews the success and failure of the US government in it’s Public and cultural diplomacy during the cold war to inform the current public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy approaches. The paper found that the US public and cultural diplomacy during the cold war failed for a long period due to the lack of various aspect such as sufficient funding, a clear low-key long-range strategy, a clear doctrinal principle, and interagency coordination-criteria in the national approach to public diplomacy.
Definition
Public diplomacy entails all the efforts by or sponsored by the Government to communicate with the foreign public either to convince target foreign sectors and garner support for its strategic measures. Also known as people’s diplomacy, PD provides the necessary groundwork for the society to accept the Government’s outreach and policies as legitimate. A poor approach to PD morphs it to disastrous propaganda and political fallacies that expose the Government and its strategic policies into public ridicule and resistance. On the other hand, cultural diplomacy is a course of action that enhances the exchange of information, ideas, art, lifestyle, language, and all aspects of culture with other nations and people to promote a mutual understanding (Luke, and Kersel, 2013. 99). The government has been using literary work, films, international media, cultural festivals, and establishing international institutions to reach out to foreign nations for support and to creates influence.
Lessons Learned from The Cold War
Sufficient Funding
One of the lessons learned about making public and cultural diplomacy more credible and reliable is the necessity of sufficient funding PD to revitalize the nation’s PD capabilities. During the cold war, PD was underfunded; it lacked a policy/ coordination criterion specifying a clear presidential mandate and an international doctrine and its relationship (Luke, and Kersel, 2013. P.102). The government’s informational campaigns during the cold war were popularized through United States Information Agency (USIA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Voice of America (VOA) (Lord, and Dale, 2007). Such media houses and other international channels need to be more funded. There is a need for a more organized, regally funded, and coordinated in relation to the diplomatic institutions already established in the target geography by other nations/ international communities. Such are the weaknesses that made PD in the cold war era take many decades to reach a breakthrough in the advocacy of democracy, individual rights, and the free market in the Soviet Union. All the agencies of PD should have clear criteria for coordinating with other international agencies established by the international community.
Interventional Approach Against Disinformation
Another lesson is that the Government should establish interventional measures against public disinformation. The ability of people (Foreign or natives) to make sound decisions regarding public policies, democratic practices, and perception of the government outreach/ policies depends on their ability to analyze facts at hand, to distinguish credible information from political fallacies leading to a rational and informed conclusion. Apparently, disinformation has been eroding the faith of the public in the US government and exacerbating partisan divides in a manner that threatens the democracy to the core. At the center of disinformation is the currently influential, popular, but less-regulated social media and the “CNN effect” (Grincheva, 2010, p.177). Consider the recently experienced COVID-19 vaccine hesitance due to media disinformation and its outcome on public wellbeing. The series of tweets from the former American president Donald Trump is presuming that the 2020’s election was leagued, eventually culminated in his loyalists storming the capital in Washington on January 6, 2021 (Miah and Sheppard, 2021). The chaotic event, later termed an insurrection, led to the death of five and injuries of many, not forgetting the bad precedent it set for future resistance (Miah and Sheppard, 2021). Perhaps the relatable issue is the recent change of the treatment of persons of different descent, religion, color, or country differently due to the federal policies of the recently ousted regime Choi, 2021, p.04-14). The different immigration and trade policies have increased international disinformation of people culminating in people rejecting products from China, mistreatment of immigrants, and the perception of Islamic descent as belonging to Terrorism (Brown, 2016; Choi, 2021, p.04). Consequently, American’s presence in the politically unstable Islamic states is popularly viewed as ill-fated and intended to harm the State’s natives. Americans find life unsafe and at high risks in countries like Mali, Somalia, Iran, Syria, and another Islamic region (Choi, 2021, p.07), and so is the national trade threatened. The trend of bias local and international perception of the government policies as ill-fated is due to poor public and cultural diplomacy (Zaharna, 2012, p.22).
Able And Consistent Top Leadership
Regarding disinformation, the government should learn that leadership and diplomacy start at the top and that the presidential regime is the first agency and symbol of diplomacy. President must therefore ensure all PD policies assented are coherent with the goal of PD and always behave in a manner that models the the cultural and public values (Lord, and Dale, 2007). For instance, the presidential role in the PD reached a climax in the cold war when president Richard Nixon’s reached out and promoted dialogue with the soviet union’s government head General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev (Lord, and Dale, 2007). Nixon demonstrated his respect for both China and the Soviet Union’s Communism by abandoning the traditional PD policy approach of containment of communism to negotiating for a free will democracy by the leaders. Nixon’s agency of PD culminated into a series of summit meetings and negotiations for human rights, democracy, bilateral agreements, and international arms control measures, thereby leading to the relaxation of the cold war tension (Lord, and Dale, 2007). The new era of troubled diplomacy begun in the era of President George W. Bush in his response to diplomatic policies following the 2002 9/11 terrorist attacks. Bush led the US into a new conflict with countries within a region he referred to as The Axis of Evil, including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea (Creswell, 2019, p.09). Bush’s regime was marked by a series of US invasions into countries that harbored, protected, or supported terrorists (Creswell, 2019, P.11). The outcome of the diplomacy policies of every regime can be distinguished by both the approach and impact. America has recently entered into a new generation of trade war, and fears in the international arms control as the immediate former regime failed attempts to stage successful diplomacy with China and North Korea (Lord, and Dale, 2007). The international community’s response to the current trade restrictions, region-discriminative immigration policies, and anti-terrorism policies is dependent on the perception of the international community toward the current presidential regime. The current regime should learn that the presidential diplomatic approach and policies model the diplomatic measures taken by all government agencies, and those reciprocated by other nations that interact with America.
Integration Of Practical Preparedness With psychological/Ideological War
America learned that cultural diplomacy alone was not an enough intervention to the international threat; rather, it should be integrated with real-time preparedness to counter the measures taken by the opposed states (Zaharna, 2012, p.22). After assuming office in 1953, president Dwight Eisenhower commissioned the Jackson Committee that recommended the necessity of international information activities in confronting Soviet and international communism (Logan, 2012). The international media were used to counter the Communist ideology and propaganda head-on to distinguish the deception of Classic Nazi the propaganda of Soviets about democracy and capitalism (Creswell, 2019, 04). However, Eisenhower’s regime had to revisit the strategy in that it had caused a consistent growth of Soviet’s military capabilities in atomic weapons. In particular, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution showcased the US’s inability to respond promptly in active support of the uprising as the Soviets crushed the upraising (Webb, 2013, p.07). The upraising discredited the US “Rolling back” propaganda, even though Radio Free Europe’s Hungarian-language broadcasts were in the front line of inciting the uprising (Webb, 2013, p.07). Therefore, as China takes tough competitive measures in technology, innovation, and trade investment, the US should take equal or advanced competitive measures, other than the mere trade restrictions and ideological competition reflected in its cultural diplomacy. Diplomacy through Films, literary work, art, Musical and pop-culture should be supported with real-time actions to develop actual capabilities in the military, capital, technology, healthcare, and fair governance reflected in art (Pamment, 2012, p.112). Similarly, as North Korea persistently continues its nuclear development, the US should make a significant investment to prepare itself against the threat, establish advanced firewalls and install technical security measures from possible future intimidations (Lord, and Dale, 2007). Pure diplomacy through cultural ideologies may be void in the future, thereby rendering American’s insecure.
Setting Long-Range, Low-Key Strategy
Similarly, the PD intervention and preparedness measures should not be focused on the short-range communication of ideas; rather, they should be based on a long-range, low-key strategy focused on positively transforming the understanding of the foreign people about American ideals and culture (Lord, and Dale, 2007). One challenge facing the PD is the deviation from its main objective and focus. America should use cultural diplomacy as a low-key alternative to PD (Pamment, 2012, p.89). For instance, in his second term, President Eisenhower’s separated the media and cultural diplomacy from his administrative policies and challenged the media to establish a long-term approach to supporting cultural diplomacy. Similarly, both Presidents J.F Kennedy and Johnson oversaw a growing estrangement of public policy and cultural diplomacy (Lord, and Dale, 2007). Many Public information programs and institutions, including the United States Information Agency (USIA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Voice of America (VOA), grew both in capacity, coverage, and autonomy. The media established a media broadcasting culture autonomous in its reporting and free from the taint and influence by the intelligence or military requirements. They focused on the provision of objective” or “balanced” News reporting and distinguished themselves from being instruments of US policy. During the period of the policy of detente, even the American government spokesmen stopped opposing communism openly. Eventually, the short-range policy of détente culminated in 1972 in signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) and SALT II in 1979 (Lord, and Dale, 2007). The overall approach was bad made the US lose focus of its main objective and goals in the cold war. Meanwhile, as the media houses and CNN effects gained autonomy and the Government became less focused on containing communism and related dictatorship, the Soviet Union modernized its nuclear arsenal, funded Terrorism and insurgencies globally, and built more arms in Eastern Europe. Eventually, the US even found itself criticizing the countries that attempted to oppose the communist regimes in 1979 (Lord, and Dale, 2007). On May 22, 1977, President Jimmy Carter recognized the past failed course of US PD by stating that “Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of Communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear” (Carter, 1977, p.01). The loss of focus is a mistake that should not be repeated in the current time. Trade wars, cold wars, and nuclear weapons containment measures should be fought objectively and relentlessly without the loss of focus for any reason.
Reconstitute, Re-Strategize, Revamp and Continuously Evaluate
The Government should learn to re-strategize, revamp and continuously evaluate its strategies for reconstitution of new roles, mandates, and control. In the cold war, the US entered a successful era through president Reagan’s actual revamping and refocusing of the US strategy. President Reagan gave the media houses new national missions, roles, and regulatory oversight in the cold war. He funded the PD organizations and embarked on a major military buildup. As the media led in the ideological struggle, the Government re-engaged the Soviet Union in integrated PD and psychological operations. Although Reagan did not realize the climax of the weakened Soviet Union, his new course of the cold war measurably hastened the communism dissolution through the new ideological war that questioned the very foundation of communism (Lord, and Dale, 2007). Rather than engaging China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and all countries in the ‘Axis of Evil’ through pure PD, the US should revamp the course integrating it with ideological/ psychological operations (Creswell, 2019, p.09; Grincheva, 2010, p.179).
Establish Specific Operational Guidelines, And Roles of The Involved Parties
The bottom line of successful operation in PD is the presence of specific operational guidelines defining the PD approach, the responsible institutions, and the mandate/roles of all the involved parties in leadership, such as the president. During the Cold War, the US lacked such guidelines. The Government overlooked the need to establish a formal criterion and approach to PD, leaving the overall duty of PD to the nation’s academic and cultural authorities and the Commercial media (Lord, and Dale, 2007). The Government should establish a mission, pacific objectives, and basic operating principles. As such, all the PD agencies will establish a shared sense of purpose, a unified PD vision, a universal set of doctrines, and a body of principles. Consequently, the principles and doctrines will help the media agencies of PD determine the audiences of information programs. In this approach, the Government should be able to regulate the media content. The guidelines can ensure that the media agencies take central, coordinated, and more consistent measures in building a public opinion about Government, thus supporting a PD support block (Lord, and Dale, 2007).
Solve Institutional Friction
Moreover, the US needs to solve the institutional friction through an overarching conceptual framework. In the cold war, there was a constant conflict between the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the State (Lord and Dale, 2007; Logan, 2012, p.21). The USIA remained resistant to the State’s control and was in a consistent pursuit of autonomy. The troubled relationship kept the USIA defiant from the mission and objectives of public policy (Logan, 2012, p.22). The Government often questioned the competencies of the media personnel while the State left the media agencies to operate on their own devices and with unregulated content. After reviewing the effectiveness of international information programs, the Stanton Commission specified the missions of PD as offering policy advice, policy information, general information, educational and cultural affairs (Lord, and Dale, 2007). The inconsistency in the media reporting and the Government reports about PD often indicated friction and left citizens confused regarding the legitimacy of government policies/actions. In the modern-day, people are more enlightened about policymaking and democratic actions; the Government should learn to ensure a smooth relationship between all the PD agencies and the media agencies so that all the concerned institutions can pursue the mission consistently without notable friction. The Government should adopt various conflict resolution method to ensure the smooth functioning of all the media and platforms that performs the duties of offering policy advice, policy information, general information, educational and cultural affairs.
Constitute A Functional Oversight Criterion
Interestingly, the performance of any agency, institution, or media culture on matters related to PD highly depends on the ability of the State to lead as a model and perform functional oversight. During the cold war, the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) was established as an oversight body for coordinating PD between the State and the White House as recommended by Jackson’s commission (Lord, and Dale, 2007). However, there existed tension between the federal and State Department’s PD coordinators. Although the National security council had been created through the 1947 National Security Act, the OCB eventually failed to lack strong leadership and clear coordination criteria. Toward the end of the cold war, the federal Government performs oversight of the informational agencies due to the sensitivity of PD to disinformation. Success occurred due to the interagency cooperation between the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD), Special Planning Group (SPG), the International Broadcasting Committee, Public Affairs Committee, and the National Endowment for Democracy, all created during Reagan’s regime (Lord, and Dale, 2007). Through the agencies, the Federal Government could perform functional oversight over all matters of government interests and security matters. The contemporary Government should learn to take measures that enhance the coordination for the state and federal government and enhance interagency cooperation between different institutions who participate in PD.
Conclusion
In essence, the contemporary Government should learn that PD and leadership in the PD starts from the top government executives through a clearly stipulated approach characterized by specific guidelines and a low-key, long-range strategic plan. The Government should learn to identify the target audiences for its PD, remain focus and avoid deviating from its objectives. The Government should establish a clear body of doctrinal principles and provide a coherent strategy and advocacy for its PD. There is a need to integrate cultural and media diplomacy with psychological/ideological challenges in the PD approach. Forming a functional oversight and clarifying an interagency coordination criterion improved the PD outcome. The Government should ensure that the PD agencies are consistent and in coordination with the State in matters of vision and opinions to solve institutional friction.
Bibliography
Brown, J.A., 2016. Running on fear: Immigration, Race and crime framings in contemporary GOP presidential debate discourse. Critical Criminology, 24(3), pp.315-331.
Carter, J., 1977. Human Rights and Foreign Policy. The speech was given at Notre Dame University, June.
Choi, S.W., 2021. Immigration policy and Terrorism: an empirical analysis. Defense and Peace Economics, 32(3), pp.271-295.
Creswell, M.H., 2019. Wasted words? The limitations of US strategic communication and public diplomacy. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 42(5), pp.464-492.
Grincheva, N., 2010. US arts and cultural diplomacy: Post-cold war decline and the twenty-first-century debate. The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society, 40(3), pp.169-183.
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Luke, C. and Kersel, M., 2013. US cultural diplomacy and archaeology: soft power, hard heritage. Routledge.
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Pamment, J., 2012. New public diplomacy in the 21st century: A comparative study of policy and practice. Routledge.
Webb, A., 2013. Cold War Radio and the Hungarian Uprising, 1956. Cold War History, 13(2), pp.221-238.
Zaharna, R.S., 2012. The cultural awakening in public diplomacy. CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, (4), p.9.
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