SOLUTION: Collective resistance to collective collaboration

Collective resistance to collectivecollaboration: a leader’s introspectionAtri Sengupta and Bhaurao SonawaneIntroductionIt was a sunny day on August 13, 2012. Mr. Surya Kant Mishra, the chief executive officerand managing director (CEO and MD) of Utkal Alumina International Limited (UAIL)[1], wasabout to deliver his retirement speech. While quickly going through the points he had jotteddown on a piece of paper, he became very emotional and was lost in deep thoughts. Hewas wondering introspectively, “how effective were my actions as a leader of the company?How much could I have engaged the stakeholders in all the company’s concerns?”BackgroundThe reference point for the story was UAIL, an ambitious Greenfield alumina refinery, cogeneration power plant and bauxite mine, which had been struggling to be commissionedsince 1992-1993. It was a joint initiative of three conglomerates as follows: INDAL, TataIndustries Limited (TIL) and Norsk Hydro Aluminum (NHA) of Norway intended to set up a100 per cent export-oriented 1 million tons per annum (MTPA) alumina refinery. Afterward,the capacity of the alumina refinery was planned to be 1.5 MTPA, expandable to 3 MTPA,while bauxite mining was planned to be 4.5 MTPA, expandable to 8.5 MTPA. The capacityof the co-generation power plant was to be 3 30 megawatts (MW).The state government initiated a land acquisition process for the plant in 1993. Around 3,000acres of land were acquired from 24 villages in the Kashipur block of Odisha[2], mostlydominated by its tribal inhabitants (indigenous peoples). Kashipur block in Rayagara districtwas characterized by its low socioeconomic status, in which the per capita income for eachfamily was far below the poverty line. Malnutrition, death from perennial diseases, a low literacyrate and poor educational and medical facilities were predominant in the area (please refer toExhibit 1 for the socioeconomic statuses of the villages affected by the project and Exhibit 2 forphotography of the area). Majority of the population earned their livelihood mainly from cropproduction with little support from the State Administration. Sometimes, farmers receivedseeds free of cost, but irrigation, guidance on the cultivation of new and improved varieties ofseeds and other forms of support were not available. A few families, who didn’t have their ownland, were depended on non-agricultural activities, e.g. poultry, fisheries, as marginal workers,etc.Despite the poor socioeconomic and health statuses of the region, land acquisition for theproject was highly criticized and resisted by the indigenous peoples, alongside antiindustrialization groups and several other social agencies. These groups believed thatindustrialization in the area would affect the lives of indigenous peoples adversely and theywere demanding the return of the land to those residents. This led to a massive delay in theproject’s initiation of more than two decades as indigenous peoples were not ready to releaseAtri Sengupta is based atthe Department of OB andHR, Indian Institute ofManagement Sambalpur,Sambalpur, India.Bhaurao Sonawane isbased at the Department ofPGPWE, Indian Institute ofManagement Raipur,Raipur, India.Disclaimer. This case is writtensolely for educational purposesand is not intended to representsuccessful or unsuccessfulmanagerial decision-making.The authors may havedisguised names; financial andother recognisable informationto protect confidentiality.DOI 10.1108/EEMCS-09-2019-0229 VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020, pp. 1-32, © Emerald Publishing Limited, ISSN 2045-0621j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj PAGE 1their land. Collective resistance led to an unforeseen incident of police firing on protestors in2000. It caused the death of three tribal villagers that created a huge panic, which led to thehalting of activities related to the project for almost year years. TIL and NHA, two of the initialpartners, withdrew themselves from the project after that and sold their stakes to Alcan andIndal. Indal was acquired in 2000 by Hindalco, a $15bn flagship metal company of the AdityaBirla Group (ABG) in 2000. Finally, UAIL became a wholly owned subsidiary of Hindalco in2007 after ALCAN sold their stake. Considering the stiff resistance from the indigenouspeoples to the placement of the refinery at Kucheipadar in Kashipur block, Hindalco proposeda new site for the project in 2004. The site was located on barren, unforested land close to theearlier site (about 21 km away from the bauxite mines), named Doraguda. A fresh project planwas initiated then. However, the issues for indigenous peoples remained unresolved. Aboveall, the conflicting interests of other stakeholders made it more challenging to deal with.Massive delays disrupted all sorts of project planning leading to dissatisfaction and a loss offaith amongst shareholders, management, contractors and vendors, employees and thegovernment. It was uncertain whether Hindalco should go ahead with the project. What type ofleaders would make due justice with the situation?Mishra’s introspectionI can remember those days during early 2008 when I first met Kumar Mangalam Birla, thechairman of ABG. He wanted me to lead UAIL through its crisis situation. Birla was intenselypassionate about the project. I was a little hesitant initially. However, Birla’s confidenceabout the business viability and his “last man standing” attitude inspired me to take up thechallenge. His encouraging vision for the project thrilled me. The strategic importance ofUAIL to Hindalco was significant as this refinery (UAIL) was supposed to be the majorfeeder for another two of Hindalco’s greenfield smelters. However, the turmoil faced byUAIL derailed this plan. I knew that adequate availability of high-quality bauxite, the rawmaterial, in the area would augment the success of the project. The high-quality bauxitecould produce low-cost, high-quality products for the worldwide market leading to acompetitive advantage for Hindalco globally. I had belief in myself and my persuasivepower to manage the adverse situation responsibly. Therefore, I accepted the offer of theCEO and MD positions on the condition of having complete autonomy in decision-makingprocesses. Kumar assured me that the management would provide all possible support.I joined UAIL in December 2008. I had two major challenges to focus on:1. Determining my immediate and far future courses of actions fitting with the core valuesand ethical culture of Hindalco.2. Engaging all concerned stakeholders with the growth trajectory of the project (pleaserefer to Exhibit 3 for the vision, mission and core values of HINDALCO).I started investigating the project immediately after joining; I collected information, at first,from internal documents, media and government reports, top management and employees.I found that the root causes of the crisis were multifaceted but mostly people-related. Theexternal environment of the organization contributed to the crisis significantly leading to aninternal disaster.I decided to open direct dialogues with all the concerned stakeholders and to begin justwith the villagers at first. Being a native of Odisha and having prior experience of leading alarge-scale manufacturing organization in the same region, I was in an advantageousposition to understand the local tribal villagers and their culture. They tended to be simple intheir nature and ways and were violent only if provoked. I had a strong empathy for theirplight: they were often victims of the region’s poor socioeconomic status, which resulted inilliteracy, malnutrition and many cases of premature death. I wanted to get a sense of theirconcerns and identify the potential amicable solutions. I was aware that nongovernmentalPAGE 2j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020organizations (NGOs), which were active in the area, created a lot of obstacles in the mindsof those poor people against the project because of their vested interests. After theincident, which caused the deaths of three tribal villagers in 2000, there was absolutely nocommunication with these people neither from the government and local administration norfrom my predecessors. NGOs, who were their only supporters, could earn their blind faithvery easily. Confined within their territory, lack of education and exposure to the outsideworld made them not only unaware of but also reluctant to discover about developmentshappened around the world. Above all, the absence of communication and lack of concernfor them from the company’s end led to complete mistrust in the minds of these indigenouspeoples about the project and its owners. My biggest challenge was not only to gain backthe trust of these peoples but also of all the concerned stakeholders. Where should I begin?First, I decided to move my office and residence to the plant site. Before then, our employeeshad been operating from the Rayagada district headquarters, 70 km away from the project site.Employees were used to visiting the site on three days of the week. Intense rain (rainfall washigh because of the tropical climate) and collective resistance often stopped them visiting thesite more regularly. Initially, they were not ready to stay at the campus. I told the managementthat I needed those employees in my team who were ready to shift to do so and the rest couldbe transferred to Hindalco’s corporate office. I wanted to send a message to each of ourstakeholders that we, at UAIL, meant to do business responsibly. Hence, in spite of thesparseness of the facilities, I shifted to the campus along with my wife as I was committed to mywork. I knew it would be difficult for my family to stay at the campus without amenities, ascompared to our accustomed lifestyle but we decided to shift and that became instrumental notonly for employee motivation but also sent a message of our seriousness to all the concernedstakeholders, especially the villagers. I believed that as a leader I should set an example firstand that would inspire others to follow me. It happened in the same way. Immediately aftermoving to the site, other employees not only shifted their offices but also got involved in buildingtheir own office infrastructure there. When their shifting was completed, I addressed them andexplained my vision for the company. I said to them that moving to the site was essential forteam morale; everyone working together to build the plant meant a lot then. We were 85 peoplewho struggled with basic amenities there, but we proudly stood together and arrangedeverything on our own. This enhanced employee morale and built a culture of cooperation andcollaboration. Then, I empowered them to manage the office’s internal issues and, following theinitial three months, I completely devoted the staff to the external issues.After finding out that I was moving to the campus, the local administration asked us to takepolice protection considering the history of hostility there. However, I politely refused policeprotection, as we wanted to be a part of the local community and work to involve itsmembers wholeheartedly in our growth trajectory. My wife started visiting the localvegetable market and temple, meeting with women villagers. I also accompanied hersometimes to the temple and on shopping trips, to begin with. Instead of calling villagers tomy office, I started visiting all 24 villages affected by the project, one by one, along with mycorporate social responsibility (CSR) team. Sometimes, we even walked in the paddy fields,full of water and mud, to get a feel for the tough lives of the tribal villagers and to talk to themamidst their reality.We listened to all their grievances. In a meeting, they were asking worriedly, “if you take ourland, how will we earn our future livelihood? What will happen to our children and family? Sofar, we live so miserably and nobody bother about that. Now you need our land and you arehere to talk to us. You are going to make us more miser.” They submitted a charter of 20demands. I could clearly sense their mistrust and hatred towards us. I decided to showthem our intention first. Hence I told to them, “let us first focus on five most crucial issuesalong with timelines of three months”. When people from NGOs started asking about thefuture of the tribal villagers, I gave them the references of other organizations located inRayagada and their consequent developments in the region. I arranged visits by a villagers’VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj PAGE 3team to a few of those organizations and to meet their respective local communities towitness the developments. In the meantime, we started working on five selected issues andensured that we addressed those well ahead of the proposed timeline of three months.These developments gave people a signal that management was concerned about them; atleast we were listening now to these poor and simple villagers.Despite a warning from the local administration, we visited the community where threevillagers had died due to police firing to control unrest in 2000. They came to know about ourinitiatives with other villages. We received a warm welcome from the villagers. In the meeting,where 160 villagers were present, one NGO employee agitated, showing the widows ofthose three deceased men and asked, “what was their fault and what would be their future”.I said, “returning their husbands’ lives were not in our hands but ensuring a good future forthem”. They said, “we want at the rate of US$63.27 per month for each of these families”. Itold them, “why US$63.27? We will give them US$105.45 along with the free education oftheir children up to 12th standard”. They became completely speechless. Theseconcessions resulted in a complete change in their mindsets. They opened themselves up tous like family members do with each other. We gave our commitments to fulfill their relativelysmall demands; in fact, we planned to do more than they demanded.I felt annoyed when I saw that these people were flying black flags on January 26 (RepublicDay in India) and August 15 (India’s Independence Day) as symbols of protest. Idemanded that in return for our commitments, they would celebrate those auspicious dayswith Indian tricolors and they did so. This received huge media coverage and attention fromall the stakeholders. All of them started taking an interest in our journey. The media, whichhad been covering the story one-sidedly until then, began focusing on other perspectivestoo. I always believed that “actions speak louder than words.” As a result, the governmentand the local administration began to cooperate with us fully. Management and otherstakeholders also regained their confidence in the project. We earned their trust. However,we still needed to go some miles further.A fresh demand came from a few landowners affected by the UAIL project, who sold theirlands in 1996-1997 at an average rate of $676.06 per acre as determined by thegovernment, and records of rights obtained in the name of the Odisha IndustrialInfrastructure Development Corporation/UAIL. They demanded higher compensation tohandover their lands to UAIL. A team of landowners, a few local political leaders and NGOpeople met me and said, “we want the landowners to be compensated equivalent to anewly purchased land by ABG in nearby locations for a different project at the rate of US$7728.84 per acre in 2006”. The price of land in 1992-1993 and 2006-2007 was certainly notsame. A negotiation took place under the supervision of the government as the landacquisition was its responsibility, and it was decided to give the landowners compensationat the rate of $4,416.48 per acre. Although we empathized with them and were ready to payat the rate of $7,728.84 per acre, the government did not agree to avoid the similar kindsof agitation in other parts of Odisha. The government was right in the sense that the landprices offered in 1997 and 2008 could not be the same.I was in favor of stopping the mediators (the middlemen) – the local leaders and the NGOpeople – from representing villagers (a few of them were landowners). I had a directdialogue with those landowners. I told them, “we are ready to pay rest $3,312.36 per acreas an ex gratia payment, but after three years, on the condition that you won’t create anyfurther disturbance and cooperate with us in finishing the project”. I knew that theseadditional payments would give us a burden of around $7.73m, which was quite amanageable amount for a project of $1,656.18m (please refer to Exhibit 4 for the project’scost details). Our management also supported me. This proactive movement of ours madethem grateful toward us and those mediators evaporated from the system. Initially, theywere hesitant to trust us but our actions in the recent past were instrumental in regainingPAGE 4j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020their trust. Peace was restored! Hindalco’s core values of integrity, commitment, passion,seamlessness and speed were major guidelines for all my strategies.My next move was to participate in all the tribal ceremonies and celebrate them wholeheartedly.My employees and our family members were also involved in this. We celebrated our ownceremonies with tribal villagers. We were enjoying living as a part of a big family.In the meantime, I had to focus on another major issue related to vendors and contractors.We roped in big contractors. However, massive delays in the project, raw material pilferagefrom the site, the shortage of labor because of collective resistance, hiring extra high-pricedskilled laborers from outside, illegitimate demands of money from local leaders andvillagers, etc., which emerged without prior anticipation, escalated the construction cost. Itwas difficult for the contractors to manage construction expenses within the agreed-uponcontract amounts and they were demanding price hikes. I knew that constructionbottlenecks would delay the project further. I convinced the management to settle on arevised rate based on the argument that with the revised rate, our project cost would still befar below the international project rates and that could give us extra competitive mileage inthe global market. The UAIL project was built for catering to both domestic and globaldemands. Therefore, this decision would be cost-effective for us. I had also borne in mindthat without settling, it could be difficult for us to get any decent contractor.I was completely aware that project cost was increasing but I was focusing on the long-termgain for the UAIL. We spent a lot of money building roads, bridges, schools, health campsand contributed too many other CSR activities for the betterment of the community.Our next focus was on the employability of these indigenous peoples. We set up an industrialtraining institute (ITI)[3] to skill them for different kinds of employment. We were alsobrainstorming about the possibilities of including those skilled laborers in the UAIL project,either on direct or indirect payroll. We were actually focusing on employment creation bothoutside and inside the factory. We announced that we would train young people in thecommunity who had passed the 10-th standard certificate in ITI and then absorbed them intoour payroll. We received around 80 candidates for training in both the first and second years.However, there were hardly 40 candidates in the third year. We had to bring people in fromoutside. As it was an automated plant, we were in need of a smaller number of technicalpeople and ITI-trained people were appointed for this purpose in the junior cadre. However,greater numbers of community members were expecting jobs at UAIL. Therefore, weidentified the nontechnical areas where the great number of generally skilled people could beaccommodated. We hired members from all the families evicted from their lands.We identified that the drop in the number of candidates was due to the lack of basic levelsof education in the region. We opened up an Odia-medium school for that purpose (Odia isthe native language of the state of Odisha). Although NGOs praised us for our all initiatives,they objected that we were not giving poor tribal children an opportunity to learn in Englishmedium schools where our employees’ children studied. They pointed out that because ofthis, discrimination between their children and our children would remain forever. Hearingthis, I instantly decided to open up an English-medium school in the locality. Aditya BirlaPublic School (ABPS)[4]. an English-medium 12-th standard national level school, openedin July 2011. Highly educated teachers were hired from outside. Immediately, we receivedaround 250 enrolments (from both tribal children and our children) in ABPS. I believed that itwas a highly effective suggestion made by the NGOs. Unlike at other ABG plants, ABPSwas set up during such an early stage of the UAIL project and that delivered extraordinaryresults (please refer to Exhibit 5 for the CSR activities of UAIL and Exhibit 6 for the costs ofCSR activities).Despite our early initiatives that resulted in a good level of social inclusion, there were fearsaroused amongst my employees and contractors because of some illegitimate actsperpetrated by a few villagers. For example, illegitimate demands for donations fromVOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj PAGE 5employees; threats to give contractual jobs, such as construction material supply (butoverpriced), to local leaders frightened both employees and contractors. Failure to fulfilltheir demands often led to agitation in front of the factory gates. One day, around 20agitated people, who were actually provoked by some local leaders from a nearby village,stopped me. I got out of my car. During our arguments, one person knocked me to theground with an iron rod. My security guards fired in the air to protect me. The mobdisappeared immediately. However, the news spread in the factory, and thereafter, to thelocal administration quickly. A police force was sent by the local administration and I wassent to be hospitalized in Vizag[5] because that had the nearest hospital to the UAILlocation. Fortunately, my injury was not so severe, and I asked to be treated there and then.I knew that if I had left the area, I would not be able to control my people, who were furiouswith the demonstrators. After getting over my initial shock, I saw what had happened as anew challenge. I requested that the police should not arrest those mob members who hadattacked me but only to announce that these people would be arrested and put behind barsfor a long time. We did not lodge any formal complaint against the mob activists. On theother hand, I urged my people not to stop work and they listened to me respectfully. Myobjective at that time was just to avoid any face-to-face meetings between my people andthe mob. The situation could worsen in that case. After the announcement by the police,family members of the mob members came to me tearfully requesting my forgiveness. Iasked them to agree in writing that they would never indulge in any illegitimate activities inthe locality and that they would earn their livelihoods in employment opportunities createdby us, for living a respectful life. They agreed and the police left the site. Thereafter, wenever looked back and the project developed as planned. The success of our initiatives wasreflected on several fronts, for example, preventing the loss of working days (Exhibit 7).I always believed that positivity resides behind any negativity. Therefore, I always identifiedthe positive side of the adverse situations and used them to the project’s advantage. Ireceived huge appreciation from my management, as well as all the stakeholdersconcerned. Could I engage all the stakeholders in the growth trajectory of UAIL, though?I know I had to neglect a few small projects, which were in need of close monitoring. Duringmy 3.5-year journey at UAIL as CEO and MD, I ensured a partial stakeholder inclusion. Howshould my successor strategize to achieve complete stakeholder inclusion or collectivecollaboration? What advice should I give him as a newly appointed advisor to UAIL?Notes1. A Greenfield project of Hindalco Industries, ABG – an Indian conglomerate.2. A state of India.3. Please refer to https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_training_institute-for-details-of-ITI (accessed19 February 2019).4. Available at: www.adityabirlaschools.com/location.html (accessed 20 February 2019).5. A city in Andhra pradesh, another state of India.6. An Indian conglomerate.ReferenceMangaraj, B.K., Aparajita, U., Dash, P.K., Dixit, B. and Gantayat, P. (2009), “Socio-economic andbaseline survey of the adjacent villages of Utkal alumina plants site in the Kashipur block of Rayagadadistrict”, A study report of Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha submitted to Utkal AluminaInternational Limited.Keywords:Leadership,Stakeholder engagement,Stakeholder management,StrategyPAGE 6j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020Exhibit 1Table EI Socioeconomic status of the region and villages affected by the projectPopulation (in %)Sl. no VillagesNo. ofhouseholds Male FemaleHousehold havingno land (in %)Household havingno electricity (in %)Household optingmigration forlivelihood (in %)Students appearedat 10-th examStudentspassed at10-th exam1 Ambiligadtunda 55 120 100 73 98 73 0 02 Andirakanch 200 450 520 30 75 85 2 03 Bagrijhola 148 518 614 0 74 47 4 204 Bhitaramuchukuni 80 100 70 13 100 50 1 05 Bilamal 183 446 290 22 71 44 5 06 Dwimundi 130 295 345 46 93 46 3 507 Gaimundatunda 60 96 69 33 100 83 0 08 Gokulmunda 70 76 74 43 43 57 3 1009 Hatikhaman 25 57 78 0 100 80 5 10010 Jogiparitunda 165 470 490 18 89 61 3 011 Kanchagumma 70 266 310 14 100 86 0 012 Kodipari 155 960 725 26 90 39 6 2013 Koral 300 490 630 60 53 53 1 2514 Lachhugude 155 440 560 39 90 97 2 10015 Lundrukona 50 85 125 0 100 60 0 016 Makapadar 45 105 95 22 87 67 10 017 Narigijodi 55 101 72 18 82 18 13 10018 Osapada 50 100 95 60 100 40 4 10019 Paikakupakhal 302 630 870 5 53 93 1 520 Perinigini 55 77 68 36 96 91 1 021 Ramibeda 30 96 88 100 67 67 10 022 Ratachuan 35 140 105 0 100 29 5 2523 Tikarapada 200 900 850 55 100 100 0 024 Tikiri 525 918 998 50 27 48 5 48Source: Study report of Utkal University, Bhubaneswar, Odisha, 2009. Mangaraj et al. (2009)(continued)VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj PAGE 7School (primary, high, etc.) Annual income (US$) Annual expenditure (US$) Expenditure spent (in %)Sl. no Villages No. available Operational Per household Per capita income Per household Per capita expenditure Food Education HealthCulturalactivities1 Ambiligadtunda 0 0 47.3 11.83 46.96 11.74 59 2 11 292 Andirakanch 1 1 60.01 12.37 55.14 11.37 60 3 6 313 Bagrijhola 1 1 65.4 8.55 64.53 8.44 64 4 10 224 Bhitaramuchukuni 0 0 52.14 24.53 36.87 17.35 59 4 5 325 Bilamal 1 1 81.34 20.23 43.94 10.93 58 8 13 216 Dwimundi 1 1 112.83 22.92 108.65 22.07 53 2 15 307 Gaimundatunda 1 1 42.93 15.61 48.08 17.48 60 5 5 318 Gokulmunda 1 1 33.17 15.49 20.46 9.54 72 1 10 169 Hatikhaman 0 0 46.63 8.63 48.57 8.99 68 9 11 1210 Jogiparitunda 1 1 40.21 6.91 44.05 7.57 70 3 7 2011 Kanchagumma 1 1 48.21 5.87 63.08 7.68 52 5 16 2712 Kodipari 1 1 49.5 4.55 45.32 4.17 62 11 8 1913 Koral 1 1 72.92 19.53 48.93 13.1 57 9 15 1914 Lachhugude 1 1 61.58 9.54 53.19 8.25 63 2 9 2615 Lundrukona 0 0 47.55 11.32 39.15 9.32 66 0 5 2916 Makapadar 0 0 55.83 12.56 60.58 13.63 51 2 5 4217 Narigijodi 0 0 32.06 10.19 56.68 18.02 62 1 8 2918 Osapada 1 1 46.03 11.8 9.8 2.51 68 6 9 1719 Paikakupakhal 1 1 18.92 3.81 20.97 4.22 57 7 16 2120 Perinigini 1 1 72.22 27.39 71.56 27.15 59 8 9 2421 Ramibeda 0 0 78.28 12.76 77.43 12.62 63 1 7 2922 Ratachuan 1 0 34.27 4.9 37.1 5.3 67 6 11 123 Tikarapada 1 1 37.84 4.32 44.24 5.06 61 3 11 2624 Tikiri 1 1 41.28 11.31 34.4 9.42 65 3 11 21Table EIPAGE 8j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020Exhibit 2. A village in Kashipur block during 2007-2008Exhibit 3. Vision, mission and values of HindalcoOur visionTo be a premium metals major, global in size and reach, excelling in everything we doand creating value for its stakeholders.Our missionTo pursue the creation of superior shareholder value relentlessly, by exceedingcustomer expectations profitably, unleashing employee potential, while being aresponsible corporate citizen, adhering to our values.Our valuesIntegrity: honesty in every action.Commitment: on the foundation of integrity, doing what it takes to deliver, as promised.Passion: missionary zeal arising out of an emotional engagement with work.Seamlessness: thinking and working together across functional silos, hierarchy levels,businesses and geographies.Speed: responding to stakeholders with a sense of urgency.Source: The company, available at: www.hindalco.com/about-us/vision-and-values (accessed20 February 2019).Plate E1VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj PAGE 9Exhibit 4. Project cost details of UAILExhibit 5. Corporate social responsibility activities of UAIL1. Education: ABPS from LKG to Std. VI with more than 150 students, out of which more than 80per cent belong to underprivileged classes of society; 32 teachers supplemented at 15 peripheral schools to promote quality education; Financial assistance to more than 100 students from land-losing families for highereducation; Construction and renovation of 5 school buildings; and Provided land for construction of high school building at Hadiguda.2. Healthcare: Full-fledged medical center for outpatients catering to more than 225 patients perday; In total, 1 mobile health unit catering to 44 villages in the Kashipur and T. Rampurblocks covering on an average 31 patients; Homeopathy services through a homeopathy dispensary set up at Nuapada; General health screening and treatment camps; Blood donation camps every six months;Table EIIIn US$ MnFinancial yearTotal projectexpenditureTangibleassetIntangibleassetCapital workin progressPoint ofpurchase(POP) Profit/loss 1992-1993–1993-1994–1994-19951995-19961996-19971997-19981998-19991999-20002000-20012001-20022002-20032003-20042004-20052005-20062006-20072007-20082008-20092009-20102010-20112011-20122012-2013Total–5.472.671.563.942.883.611.450.470.543.2111.4025.2575.48110.66171.18244.44278.59385.721,328.51Project cost0.010.021.510.640.241.670.030.060.021.701.701.765.681.556.720.241.9725.9251.2200000000000000005.2205.220.821.461.010.760.061.550.030.000.000.304.5115.2334.07129.72177.03208.31332.58359.801,261.944.641.191.062.542.703.491.510.530.561.215.198.2735.7220.6112.5735.9061.180.0010.12000000000000003.250.522.8718.1224.75Loss Source: The company (used https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_rupee_exchange_rate_history forthe conversion rate from INR to USD average of the year)PAGE 10j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 Comprehensive eye care service including cataract surgery for 63 patients; Anemia detection, treatment and awareness camps held regularly; Round-the-clock services by 2 ambulances and donation of an ambulance to thecommunity health center, Kashipur; In total, 40 hand pump bore wells and 3 spring-based water supply systems; Disinfection of drains and waterlogging areas to guard against the spread ofdisease; Facilitating immunization through the pulse polio program; Supply of assets to PHC (new) at Tikiri and Kucheipadar; and Awareness of health care through rallies, competitions and street plays.3. Sustainable livelihood: Technical training of 50 persons in various trades through company sponsorshipindustrial training centers at Kashipur/Rayagada; Promotion of improved vegetable cultivation and capacity building of farmersthrough various training, exposure visits, etc.; Irrigation facilities through the construction of check dams, irrigation channels,bore wells, ring wells, ponds and diversion-based irrigation structures; Promotion of commercial broiler poultry farming with 7 farmers; and Organizing regular livestock vaccination camps in 15 peripheral villages againstfoot and mouth disease, hemorrhagic septicemia, black quarter, peste des petitsruminants and enterotoxaemia and treatment camps.4. Village infrastructure development: Village electrification in all project-affected villages; Community center construction/renovation (7 villages); Market yard (2 villages); Cement concrete road and drain construction/repair (more than 100 portions); Road repair (more than 20 portions); Water-bound macadam roads (more than 15 portions); Bridges, culverts and causeways (more than 40); Steps (staircases) to rivers (more than 20); Bus shelters/rest sheds (5 villages); Sitting altars (10); Temples, puja mandaps, boundary walls and protection walls (more than 100); Small water tanks/vats (15); Streetlights (150); and Hand pump platforms (21).5. Social interventions: Cultural festivals; Organizing sports events (volleyball); Supply of sports materials and supporting sports and cultural activities; Support to Chaiti and Ghumura (district-level sociocultural programs) at Rayagadaand Bhawanipatna, respectively; and Relief support to disaster-affected peoples.Source: The company.VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020 j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj PAGE 11Exhibit 6. Investment of UAIL in CSR activitiesExhibit 7Corresponding authorAtri Sengupta can be contacted at: atrisengupta@iimsambalpur.ac.inTable EIIISectorYearly CSR expenditure from FY 2010-2011 to FY 2016-2017(in US$ Mn)2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013Education 0.15 0.24 0.21Health care 0.02 0.10 0.11Sustainable livelihoods 0.26 0.35 0.08Infrastructure development 0.85 0.65 1.16Social interventions 0.44 0.04 0.09Total 1.71 1.38 1.66Source: The company (used https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_rupee_exchange_rate_history forthe conversion rate from INR to USD average of the year); FY: financial yearFigure E1 Reducing trend in loss of workdays127142823280 0 0050100150Loss of Work -daysSource: The Company2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014PAGE 12j EMERALD EMERGING MARKETS CASE STUDIESj VOL. 10 NO. 1 2020