Week 4 Case Study
Read the case Hostettler v. College of Wooster in Chapter 13. Write a 1-2 paragraph summary of the case and answer the case questions listed under #3 only.
The case study must have these 2 sections:
Summary: Write a 1-2 paragraph summary of the key facts and legal issues in the case.
Case Questions: Answer each of the questions listed under #3, following the case using the facts of the case and the concepts introduced in the textbook. You must also clearly explain your reasoning. Be sure to number your responses.
APA format is required. This includes APA citation to information from the textbook within the text of the summary and answers to the questions in addition to a separate reference page.
Only answer the question that is highlighted!
Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2018)
Heidi Hostettler was hired as an HR Generalist by the College of Wooster in late summer 2013. At the time that she was interviewed and took the position, she was four-months pregnant. Throughout the hiring process, Hostettler was open about her pregnancy[, which the College of Wooster said they could be willing to accommodate]. For the first five months—before her maternity leave—Hostettler’s employment seemed to be a mutually beneficial arrangement. [. . .]
Hostettler started her maternity leave at the beginning of February and took her full 12 weeks. She was slated to return to work at the end of April. But as the time to return to work approached, Hostettler experienced severe postpartum depression and separation anxiety. Hostettler’s OB/GYN, Dr. David Seals, testified that “she had one of the worst cases of separation anxiety” that he had ever seen. Seals explained that she did not seem like herself and that she cried during almost every appointment with him. He prescribed her an antidepressant.
Seals also thought that it would be a bad idea for Hostettler to return to work right away, and testified that he believed that “it was medically necessary that [Hostettler] could work a reduced schedule.” He suggested that she return to work on a part-time basis for the “foreseeable future.”. . . Concerned that she could not return to work, Hostettler met with her direct supervisor, Marcia Beasley, and explained how she was doing and that she would need more time before coming back. According to Hostettler, Beasley was “sympathetic and understood.” [. . .]
In the beginning of May, [w]hen Hostettler returned to work, Beasley recommended that. . . Hostettler work five half days a week [. . .] Wooster informed Hostettler that it would accommodate her part-time schedule until June 30, at which time she should submit an updated certification from her doctor. [. . .]
The parties disagree over what happened during the following two months. Hostettler continued to suffer from depression and anxiety. And if she had to work much later than noon—her modified stop page 759time—she would have panic attacks, during which she would have difficulty breathing, thinking, and even walking. But with an accommodated schedule, Hostettler contends that she was able to do everything required of her position. [. . .]
Apparently, Beasley agreed with much of what Hostettler. . . concluded [and one of her colleagues confirmed]. [. . .] Throughout Hostettler’s time at Wooster, there had been no complaints about her work or conduct. Beasley stated that Hostettler never failed to perform any responsibility or finish any assignment in a timely manner. And her first evaluation, done in June or July of 2014—shortly before Hostettler was fired—contained no negative feedback but instead concluded that “Heidi is a great colleague and a welcome addition to the HR team!”
At the same time, however, Beasley felt that Hostettler’s modified schedule put a strain on Beasley and the rest of the department. She testified that during that time, Hostettler did not perform critical functions of her job, such as filling job openings, and leading trainings and lunch programs. As a result, Beasley was “just running from one thing to another to get things done” and was “really overwhelmed and left without anyone in the office to help with responsibilities and tasks that came up.” She also contended that work in the department was left unfinished or ignored. And Beasley was concerned that an upcoming online benefits project would leave the HR team even more short-staffed. But when pressed to identify any specific responsibilities or assignments that were not completed, Beasley repeatedly was unable to name any. [. . .]
At the conclusion of the first two weeks of July, Seals submitted an updated medical certification, in which he explained that Hostettler should continue to work half-time and estimated that she might return to full-time employment at the beginning of September. Hostettler contends, however, that on the day after Seals submitted the medical certification, she followed up with Beasley, asking again about extending her hours from 8:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. Beasley never responded.
The next day, Beasley fired Hostettler. Beasley sent her a letter, stating that because her updated medical certification required her to work half-time, she was “unable to return to [her] assigned position of HR Generalist in a full time capacity” and was being terminated. A few weeks later, Beasley hired a temporary clerical employee to handle some of the administrative work in the department. But that employee did not do any of the tasks that the department required an HR Generalist to complete. As a result, Hostettler’s firing left the department with fewer resources for employee relations, training, and hiring. It was not until October of that year that Wooster hired Hostettler’s replacement—a man.
Hostettler sued Wooster, claiming violations of the ADA, the FMLA, Title VII’s prohibition against sex discrimination, and corresponding Ohio state laws. Wooster moved for summary judgment on all claims and Hostettler moved for partial summary judgment on her ADA claim. The district court denied Hostettler’s motion and granted Wooster’s motion on all of Hostettler’s claims.
Daughtrey, C.J.
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Discussion
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The Americans with Disabilities Act
The ADA forbids “discriminat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” as it applies to hiring and firing. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Prohibited discrimination also includes “not making reasonable accommodations,” id. § 12112(b)(5)(A), such as “part-time or modified work schedules,” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2)(ii) (2012). There are two ways that a litigant can prove discrimination—directly or indirectly—each with its own test. See Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885, 891 (6th Cir. 2016). “Distinguishing between cases that involve direct evidence of discrimination and those in which the plaintiff is not able to introduce direct evidence is vital because the framework for analyzing the two kinds of cases differs.”214 Id. at 892. [. . .]
Under the direct method of proof the plaintiff must show (1) that she is an individual with a disability, and (2) that she is otherwise qualified for her job despite the disability “(a) without accommodation from the employer; (b) with an alleged ‘essential’ job requirement eliminated; or (c) with a proposed reasonable accommodation.”215 Ferrari, 826 F.3d at 891. . . Claims that allege a failure to accommodate page 760“necessarily involve direct evidence.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 868. Inversely, then, termination for no reason other than alleged problems with an already-in-place accommodation should involve the same direct standard of proof. [. . .]
No inferences are required in this case. Beasley admitted that Hostettler was fired solely because the college determined that it no longer could accommodate her modified schedule. Indeed, when Beasley was asked whether, by referring to Hostettler’s inability to work full-time, she was “pointing to [Hostettler’s] need for a modified work schedule . . . and no other reason,” Beasley readily agreed. [. . .] Because the resolution of the case revolves around the questions of the direct test, we apply it here.
Individual with a Disability
In the first step of the direct test, a plaintiff alleging an ADA violation must establish that she is an individual with a disability. The district court skipped this step, however, presumably because it presumed that Hostettler satisfied the definition of an individual with a disability. [. . .]
Under the post-2008 ADA law, Hostettler plainly is an individual with a disability. In keeping with the remedial purposes of the ADAAA, “[t]he definition of disability” under the ADA “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A). That is because the primary concern of the ADA is “whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred,” not whether an individual’s impairment is a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii). [. . .]
Wooster does not dispute that when Hostettler was experiencing her depression and anxiety she was substantially limited in her ability to care for herself, sleep, walk, or speak, among others. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). That is enough for her to be considered an individual with a disability under the ADA.
Otherwise Qualified
The crux of this case is whether Hostettler was otherwise qualified for her position. The district court concluded that as a matter of law she was not. But both parties have presented sufficient evidence to raise genuine disputes of material fact that preclude summary judgment.
To show that she is otherwise qualified for a position—and thus meet her prima facie burden—an employee must show that she can perform the essential functions of a job with or without an accommodation. “A job function is essential if its removal would fundamentally alter the position.” Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 883 F.3d 595, 603 (6th Cir. 2018). [. . .] Put another way, essential functions are the core job duties, not the marginal ones. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (n)(1).
This analysis does not lend itself to categorical rules—it is “highly fact specific.” Mosby-Meachem, 883 F.3d at 605. . . [C]ourts must perform a fact-intensive analysis. In determining what functions are essential, courts may consider as evidence—among other things—the amount of time spent on a particular function; the employer’s judgment; “written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing” for the position; and the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the particular function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Although the employer’s judgment receives some weight in this analysis, see Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs., 847 F.3d 384, 391–92 (6th Csr. 2017), it is not the end-all—especially when an employee puts forth competing evidence. See id. at 393. [. . .]
Hostettler presented evidence that she satisfied all the core tasks of her position. . . . What is more, statements by Wooster’s representative (and the person who fired Hostettler), Marcia Beasley, support Hostettler’s conclusion. Beasley gave Hostettler her employee review while Hostettler was working a part-time schedule. The review did not mention that Hostettler was needed on a full-time basis. Instead, it was very positive, praising Hostettler’s work. [. . .] And during her deposition, Beasley explained that Hostettler never had failed to complete a task or meet a responsibility in a timely manner. Although Beasley contended that there were tasks that were not being completed, she was unable to name any specifically. In the end, Hostettler never received a performance improvement plan, discipline, written criticism, or even a single complaint about her work.
In many circumstances, that much evidence might be sufficient to grant summary judgment in an employee’s favor. But here the record does contain some evidence that Hostettler was not completing all of her work during her part-time schedule. Beasley stated that she was overwhelmed as the only one in the office to handle employees who showed up unexpectedly to talk about an issue. And because there was no one in the office to help with the issues Beasley faced, some event-planning responsibilities “dropped through the cracks.” Beasley further explained that Hostettler’s absence was putting a strain on the department. The six-person department recently was down another employee on maternity leave. And two of the remaining employees were beginning an online benefits project in July, which would take up a significant amount of their time.
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Wooster may have preferred that Hostettler be in the office 40 hours a week. And it may have been more efficient and easier on the department if she were. But those are not the concerns of the ADA: Congress decided that the benefits of gainful employment for individuals with disabilities—dignity, financial independence, and self-sufficiency, among others—outweigh simple calculations of ease or efficiency. To that end, the ADA requires that employers reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities, including allowing modified work schedules. An employer cannot deny a modified work schedule as unreasonable unless the employer can show why the employee is needed on a full-time schedule; merely stating that anything less than full-time employment is per se unreasonable will not relieve an employer of its ADA responsibilities.
[The court thus concludes that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer].
Failure to Engage in Interactive Process
Once an employee requests an accommodation, the employer has a duty to engage in an interactive process. Specifically, the employer must “identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome those limitations.” Mosby-Meachem, 883 F.3d at 605–06 (citations omitted). Employers must engage in a “good faith” process and an “individualized inquiry” to determine whether a reasonable accommodation can be made. Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1045 (citations omitted).
The district court ruled that Wooster satisfied this requirement because Beasley met with Hostettler four times in early July, and they discussed Hostettler’s employment and the needs of both parties. The district court concluded that although the parties met and discussed accommodations, Hostettler was unwilling to accept anything less than her part-time schedule and“[t]he law does not require that the parties meet and that the employer concede to the employee’s request.”
But that conclusion is wrong for the same reason that the rest of the district court’s ADA analysis is incorrect—it decides between competing facts, thus misapplying the summary-judgment standard. It is undisputed that Beasley and Hostettler met four times in early July. But what is unclear is what was discussed in those meetings. [. . .] In short, there is competing record evidence that makes it unclear whether, or how, Wooster was willing to engage in the interactive process. For this reason also, summary judgment was improper.
Title VII Sex/Pregnancy Discrimination Claim
The grant of summary judgment to Wooster on Hostettler’s Title VII sex/pregnancy claim also was improper. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach, the district court assumed that Hostettler satisfied her prima facie burden. But relying on its determination under the ADA that Hostettler could not satisfy an essential function of her job, the district court concluded that Wooster had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to fire her. And, the court added, because Hostettler neither argued pretext nor pointed to any evidence that would support a finding of pretext, she could not carry her burden.
But, in fact, Hostettler did argue that Wooster’s decision was pretextual. “Plaintiffs may show that an employer’s proffered reasons for an adverse employment action are pretext for discrimination if the reasons ‘(1) have no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate the action; or (3) were insufficient to warrant the action.’”216 Demyanovich v. Cadon Plating & Coatings, L.L.C., 747 F.3d 419, 431 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012).
Hostettler satisfied that burden. First, as described above, the district court wrongly concluded that full-time presence was an essential function of her position. Because there remain genuine disputes of material fact on that question, a jury could find that Wooster’s proffered reason for firing Hostettler “ha[s] no basis in fact” or “did not actually motivate the action.” Demyanovich, 747 F.3d at 431 (quoting Seeger, 681 F.3d at 285). Similarly, Hostettler pointed to two employees who received longer periods of medical leave for non-pregnancy conditions—one received 23 weeks of leave and another received 24 weeks of leave. That those employees were not fired is a circumstance sufficient to create a dispute of fact over whether Wooster’s proffered explanation was insufficient to justify firing Hostettler. See id.
As with Hostettler’s ADA claims, there remain disputes of material fact on Hostettler’s Title VII claim. Thus, summary judgment was inappropriate.
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Conclusion
Application of the proper summary-judgment standard answers the questions raised in this appeal. Each party has presented evidence supporting its conclusion on each contested issue. But instead of holding that these contradictory facts precluded summary judgment, the district court page 762weighed the evidence against Hostettler and decided in favor of Wooster as a matter of law. In doing so, the district court misapplied both the summary-judgment standard and our ADA precedents. Repeating that error, the district court decided that the conclusion on Hostettler’s ADA claim necessarily doomed her FMLA and Title VII sex/pregnancy claims as well. Because all of these errors involve improper factual determinations, we REVERSE the order of the district court and REMAND the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Case Questions
Does Hostettler have a claim for relief under the ADA? According to the court, what is the appropriate test to prove discrimination in this case? Under this test, what then does Hostettler need to show?
Is full-time attendance an essential job function of Hostettler’s position? Was Hostettler otherwise qualified for her position? If Hostettler was failing to fulfill her duties, what steps ought the College of Wooster have taken before firing Hostettler?
Do you believe the employer made a good-faith effort to reasonably accommodate the employee? Can you imagine a reasonable accommodation the College of Wooster otherwise might have been able to provide for Hostettler? Why might it be in the employer’s best interest to provide reasonable accommodations to people with disabilities, regardless of whether there is a requirement to provide an accommodation?
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