SOLUTION: Abstract and Keywords Today, the EU counts as the most prominent and

Abstract and Keywords

Today, the EU counts as the most prominent and influential regional organization in the world. But this does not make it a “model” for the rest of the world. This chapter high lights regionalisms’ origins and contributions in varied contexts and examines how theo ries of regional integration derived from the EU’s life history found a limited applicability to regionalisms in the non-Western world. The chapter discusses emerging points of con vergence and variation between the EU approach to regionalism and regionalisms in oth er parts of the world. It argues that the diffusion of the EU model is possible only through a process of localization in different regional contexts. A key task for comparative region alism is to develop approaches that capture and explain the diversity of regions. Theories such as “new regionalism” need to be supplemented with perspectives, such as the “re gional worlds” idea, and newer constructivist perspectives on norm diffusion.

Keywords: EU-centrism, regional worlds, new regionalism, comparative regionalism, regional integration, diffu sion and localization

REGIONALISM is not a European or Western idea or approach, but has had worldwide heritage and multiple manifestations. But theories of regionalism barely reflect this fact. Its theoretical literature remains European Union (EU)-centric. Attempts to offer a broad er intellectual history of regionalism and develop approaches that capture the diversity and complexity of regionalisms around the world have been scarce. To account for the di versity of the normative and institutional dimensions of regionalism is a central theoreti cal challenge facing comparative regionalism scholars.

As a first step, the field needs to move beyond what may be called EU-centrism. This is not the same as “Eurocentrism” because there are different conceptions and forms of re gionalism in Europe, or for that matter in the “West.” For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a form of “hegemonic regionalism” (Acharya, 1992), or re gionalism crafted by a dominant power, is quite different from the Council of Europe (CoE) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which are more inclusive groupings (Chapter 9 by Schimmelfennig, this volume). There is also the

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nascent notion of Euro-Mediterranean regionalism, and the emerging Eurasian regional ism, being promoted by Russia in recent years with at least an overlap with the Europe of the “West” (Chapter 10 by Hancock and Libman, this volume).

Moreover, a non-EU-centric perspective does not mean the EU’s record should be ig nored. The EU is a key part of the story of contemporary regionalism that every student of regionalism should be familiar with. By non-EU-centric I mean rejecting the tendency to view the EU as a “model” of regionalism with the expectation that other regionalisms should follow that model in order to be judged successful. It also means not assuming the universal applicability of theories of regionalism that have moved in tandem with the life history of the EU in its different stages. In other words, EU-centrism in comparative re gionalism refers to the tendency to judge other regionalisms in terms of a benchmark that

(p. 110) draws heavily from the EU’s institutions and processes, while ignoring other pos sible approaches to regionalism and refusing to view their performance in terms of the goals set by themselves.

The desire to cast the EU as a model is to some extent understandable, since the EU, while not without limitations and failures can reasonably claim to be the most effective form of regional organization in the world. But acknowledging its successes is one thing, expecting other regional groups to follow the EU’s approach to integration is quite anoth er. Because of the historical, political, economic, and normative differences, the EU model has not and will not travel well in the developing world, notwithstanding efforts by the EU itself to export its approach around the world. While this effort might have enjoyed some

A key argument of this chapter is that it is limiting and ethnocentric to apply integration theories, which reflected a distinctive set of political and economic conditions and norma tive aspirations in post-World War II Western Europe, to explain the origins and develop ment of regionalisms in the post-colonial world. Here, the end goal (or dependent vari able) was not integration (in the sense of development of some degree of supranational ism), but autonomy (preservation of state sovereignty).

To be sure, in studying comparative regionalism, one should not ignore what might be called “overlapping diversity,” i.e. the similarities and differences, and the autonomy as well as interconnectedness, among regionalisms around the world. But a non-EU-centric perspective on comparative regionalism must take into account the distinctiveness of dif ferent regions and their institutional designs, patterns, and “styles” of cooperation.

In offering a non-EU-centric perspective on regionalism, this chapter proceeds in three steps. First, it highlights the contributions of non-European regions, especially Latin America and Asia, to the idea and institutional development of regionalism. Second, it dis cusses the disjuncture, or lack of fit between theories of regionalism that are primarily derived from the EU and the development of regionalism in the non-Western world. Third, it highlights variations among contemporary regionalisms in different parts of the world

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successes, these are in many cases superficial.

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including Europe, Asia, Latin America, and Africa (in goals, institutional design, and out comes).

To illustrate the disjuncture between Eurocentric theories of regionalism and the actual development of regionalism in the non-European world, the following section will first identify ideas or theories of regionalism and then discuss the extent to which they cap ture or correspond to the practical aspects of regionalism. This approach is intended to show how different ideas and theories of regionalism, including international relations theories applied to regionalism (like liberalism) and specific integration theories (like neo-functionalism) fall short when explaining what is happening in the non-European world and in anticipating what may be coming next.

(p. 111) Beyond Europe: Regionalism’s Multiple

and Global Heritage

Defining regionalism as the building of formal or informal institutions at the regional lev el (Chapter 1 by Börzel and Risse, this volume), one can find a variety of purposes, forms, and functions of regionalism around the world. Since the nineteenth century, these in clude:

• Great power spheres of influence, or hegemonic regionalism: Examples include Germany’s Mitteleuropa, and Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The Concert of Europe might also be included here as a collective form of great power hegemony. Some consider America’s Cold War era multilateral alliances in the Third World such as the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO, also known as the Manila Pact) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, also known as the Baghdad Pact) as examples of hegemonic regionalism (Acharya, 1992).

• Approaches to conflict management: In this role, regionalism has been thought to be either an alternative, or a “stepping stone” to the universalism of the United Nations (UN) Charter (Wilcox, 1965; Nye, 1975; Schreuer, 1995).

• Expressions of cultural identity and autonomy: Examples include pan-Americanism (Fawcett and Serrano, 2005), pan-Arabism (Barnett, 1995), pan-Africanism (Legum, 1962; Esedebe, 1994), pan-Asianism (Acharya, 2009), and European identity (Parsons, 2003; Checkel, 2005).

• A framework for the suppression of nationalism and war through economic and polit ical integration (only the EU belongs here).

• Platforms for advancing decolonization and national liberation: This was a major mo tivation behind regionalisms in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

• Sites of resistance to great power intervention: This motivation and function of re gionalism applies to Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.

• Efforts to promote economic development (through regional self-reliance) and politi cal stability: These include developing countries (Association of Southeast Asian Na

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tions [ASEAN], Union of South American Nations [UNASUR], Southern African Devel opment Community [SADC], and Economic Community of West African States [ECOW AS]; Acharya, 2011).

• Signposts of fragmentation of the global liberal order into competing strategic or economic blocs (Ikenberry, 2011; Acharya, 2014).

The implications of such a broader understanding of regionalism are quite clear. Region alism as an empirical phenomenon has had its roots and branches not just in Europe but also in many other parts of the world. Hence it is essential to distinguish (p. 112) it from a specific West European (European Economic Community [EEC]/EU) form and function, which is but one of the many varieties of regionalism in world politics. Such an under standing also opens the door to a wider range of theoretical concepts and approaches to study regionalism, rather than those specifically derived from the EEC/EU experience.

Overall, even though some of these ideas did not always find concrete or durable institu tional forms, ideas of regionalism were by no means confined to Europe. Ideas of region alism in Latin America started about the same time as the Concert of Europe (1815), but unlike the latter, it was not a collective hegemony of the great powers over the weak. The non-Western regionalist ideas and institutional forms (Japan’s Co-Prosperity Sphere being a major exception) were generally more progressive and emancipatory than the Concert of Europe. While the Concert of Europe was essentially conservative, or reactionary, re gionalist ideologies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were geared to anti-colonialism, na tional liberation, protecting sovereignty, and challenging the dominance of big powers (as with Latin America’s resistance to the US Monroe Doctrine). This also differentiated them from the more progressive European groupings, such as the CoE (founded in 1949) and the EEC (founded in 1957) which aimed at taming nationalism (and sovereignty in the case of the EEC) by protecting and promoting human rights, democracy, and the rule of law as key prerequisites for peace and prosperity. Early regionalist movements in what came to be known as the Third World were mainly geared to advancing national libera tion from Western colonial rule (in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean), and avoiding and managing the competitive US–Soviet rivalry in the Third World.

It is also noteworthy that the most vocal advocacy of regionalism in the post-World War period came from the Latin American states during the debates over the drafting of the UN Charter at the San Francisco conference in 1945. While the US expressed a strong preference for universalism, delegates from 21 Latin American countries fervently de manded a place for regionalism within the UN Charter, contesting the US preference which sought to give the sole authority for maintaining global peace and security to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Some Latin American delegations, such as Brazil, argued that matters pertaining to the security of regions should be resolved exclusively by re gional groups of the area, with “the intervention of the Security Council in the solution of these questions only being justified when they endanger the peace of more than one re gional group.”2 Others accepted a place for regionalism in the UN system, but subject to the overall authority of the UNSC. Either way, they showed a strong passion for regional ism, drawing upon the experience in building regionalism over the past five decades. This

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was brought out clearly in the statement of the delegate of Mexico, Ambassador Castillo Najera, who referred to the desire of the delegations of the American nations to showcase and preserve their “Pan-American ideal.” As he put it, “the first consideration of the dele gations of the American nations was to safeguard their greatest achievement, the most precious flower of cooperation for security through peaceful means.”3 The delegate of Venezuela, Parra Perez, characterized the pro-regionalist attitude of the American nations as a “question of safeguarding a whole (p. 113) tradition [Inter-American system] which was dear to our continent, that of a living organism and a very active one.”4 Delegations from the newly formed Arab League submitted the League’s Charter as an example of re gional arrangements that should find a place in the new global security system. Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the head of the US delegation to the San Francisco conference, rec ognized the special role of the Latin American countries, in securing regional organiza tions due recognition under the UN Charter:

we have found a sound and practical formula for putting regional organizations in to effective gear with the global institution which we here erect on behalf of the world’s peace and security … We do not thus subtract from global unity … on the contrary, we weld these regional king-links into the global chain … one of these king-links is particularly dear to the hearts of the twenty-one republics in this Western Hemisphere. It is a precious inheritance with 50 years of benign history behind it … There are other regional arrangements of great honor and validity. I exclude none of them when I speak of Pan-Americanism as a symbol. I simply point to it as being the oldest and happiest regional arrangement in the world.

Although the advocates of regionalism compromised by accepting that regional arrange ments should only function under the final authority of the UNSC, rather than indepen dent of it, the advocacy of the delegations from Latin America and the Arab world was crucial in giving regionalism a legal basis as a means of dispute settlement and collective security under the UN charter. This allowed regionalism to become more relevant as the authority of the UNSC was undermined by the Cold War stalemate between the US and the Soviet Union.

While considering the multiple sources of regionalism, one should also take into consider ation developments in Asia. One important attempt to conceptualize regionalism in the very early stages of the post-Cold War era (Acharya, 2012), can be found in the edited vol ume, Regionalism and World Security, published in 1948 under the editorship of Indian scholar-diplomat K. M. Panikkar. In his introduction to the volume, Panikkar (1948) distinguished between two forms of regionalism. One was the “establishment of the para mountcy of a Great Power in a defined geographical region.” This form meant “nothing more than a polite phraseology for lebensraum” (Panikkar, 1948, 1). Another form which he articulated would be more progressive, geared to advancing “standards of living, so cial and economic progress, and the observance of human rights and fundamental free doms.” Panikkar argued that such forms of regionalism were more relevant, and more needed in “the regions further away from Europe and America” (Panikkar, 1948, 5–6). While by no means a theory of regionalism in the sense of offering a causal mechanism of

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why regionalism comes about and why it succeeds or fails, it was a useful marker in the shift from hegemonic to progressive regionalism well before the founding of the EEC. And it is this non-exclusive and emancipatory form that became the standard bearer of region alism in the non-Western world.

(p. 114) Later, regionalism and inter-regionalism found expression alongside nationalism in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, as exemplified in the Asian Relations Conferences of 1947 and 1949, the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung in 1955, as well as in the forma tion of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) within the first two decades after World War II. At a time when much of Africa and the Middle East was still under colonial rule, the OAU and the Arab League functioned more as “the instrument of national independence rather than of re gional integration” (Miller, 1973, 58). Moreover, regional groups in the non-Western world practiced an inclusive form of regionalism, both normatively and institutionally. With few exceptions, they did not exclude countries because of domestic political or eco nomic systems. Exceptions are the OAU’s exclusion of apartheid South Africa, the OAS’ suspension of Cuba under US pressure, and the Arab League’s boycott of Israel.

While it is hard to develop any theory from these diverse forms of regionalism, it is quite clear that the purpose of many of the non-EU regionalist ideas and interactions was to seek autonomy, meaning securing independence from colonial rule and limiting the inter vention of outside powers in regional affairs. This idea of autonomy differentiates many regionalist efforts in the non-Western world from the EU, whose leitmotif has been inte gration.

Integration Theories and Regionalism Outside

Europe

In considering theories of regionalism, the first thing scholars often start from is a body of theory that brings together federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism, and transac tionalism (also known as communications theory; see Chapter 3 by Börzel, this volume). Its history is too well known to require elaboration here. But they have had a common el ement. They developed out of and reflected a West European and/or Euro–US (transat lantic is too broad to fit here) context. Federalism and transactionalism reflected the West European and US context, whereas neo-functionalism, a modified form of functionalism stressing the role of supranational institutions in driving integration, was based on an even narrower ontology on the sense of being uniquely West European. Nye highlights the common thread in all these theories: “What these studies had in common was a focus on the ways in which increased transactions and contacts changed attitudes and transna tional coalition opportunities, and the ways in which institutions helped to foster such in teraction” (Nye, 1988, 239).

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But the integration theories, which closely paralleled the origins and evolution of the EEC, were ill-fitted in explaining regionalism in the non-Western world, not because they mis-predicted regionalism in the non-Western world but because their presumed starting conditions such as pluralistic interest politics and economic interdependence did not ap ply in the non-Western world. Moreover, experiments in regional integration (p. 115) out side Europe did not take off. Differences in historical, political, and economic conditions made regional integration theories inapplicable to the non-Western world. One major rea son for this had to do with differing motivating forces. The EEC was basically conceived as a project to tame nationalism and constrain state sovereignty; non-Western region alisms were inspired by exactly the opposite motivations, to advance nationalism and pre serve sovereignty after centuries of colonial rule. This genetic variation explained and continues to explain why the EU model has failed to find much resonance in the non- Western world.

Although parts of the Third World developed regional groups, some inspired by the EEC, none succeeded in achieving a comparable level of integration. Examples include the Central American Common Market (once regarded as the very model of the neo-function alist approach outside the EEC), the Latin American Free Trade Area (abolished in 1980), and the East African Community. Nowhere in the non-Western world would economic re gionalism based on the EEC model, involving market centralization and generation of welfare gains, produce the desired “spill-over” effect leading to cooperation over security issues. In general, regional economic integration in the Third World turned out to be “much more rudimentary than in Europe, more obscure in purpose and uncertain in con tent” (Gordon, 1961, 245). This raised basic questions regarding the applicability of the functionalist approach to the Third World. Even the father of neo-functionalism, Ernst Haas (1973, 117), acknowledged that the “application [of the neo-functionalist model] to the third world … sufficed only to accurately predict difficulties and failures of regional integration, while in the European case some successful positive prediction has been achieved.”

Why did they fail? Some cite “the reefs of distrust, non cooperation and parochial nation alism,” in stifling regionalism in the non-Western world (Duffy and Feld, 1980, 497). Dif ferences in political systems and processes between developed Western European mem bers of the EEC and the developing countries experimenting with regional integration were also important factors. Nye’s observations concerning the prospect for functional ism in the Third World are especially apt:

Many of the general characteristics of politics in less developed countries are diffi cult to reconcile with quiet functionalism. Leadership tends to be personalistic; heroes have trouble cooperating. The gap between the literate elite and the illiter ate masses, the scarcity of organized interest groups, and the cultural cleavage between city and countryside, which might seem to free the hands of the elites for international integration, have more often resulted in insecurity, isolation, and di version of attention to internal integration. Scarcity of middle level administrative manpower results in weak governmental and political institutions, which are sus

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ceptible to disruption by the relatively organized institutions such as the army. The adaptability of governments under these conditions tends to be low.

(Nye, 1968, 381–382)
Ernst Haas offered a similar explanation of why Western approaches to and explanations

of regionalism did not travel well beyond Europe. In an article published in 1961,
Haas compared the Western hemisphere, the Arab region, and the European members of the Soviet bloc, and concluded that the conditions required for integration in the EEC area, such as an industrial economy and liberal politics, did not obtain elsewhere. He thus concluded that “Whatever assurance may be warranted in our discussion of European in tegration is not readily transferable to other regional contexts” (Haas, 1961, 378). Cru cially, Haas did not imply that regional integration in other parts of the world, driven by “different functional pursuits” than that in Western Europe, and “responding to a differ ent set of converging interests,” would not succeed. On the contrary, other regions will have their own functional objectives and approaches to integration, or “impulses peculiar to them.” These differences in purpose and trajectories led Haas to conclude that there could be no “universal ‘law of integration’ deduced from the European example” (Haas, 1961, 389). But Haas’ prescient warning seemed to have been ignored by those latter-day advocates of the “European example,” who tended to judge, explicitly or implicitly, the performance of non-European regional institutions on the basis of the European bench mark. To quote Richard Higgott, the European project acquired “paradigmatic status … against which all other regional projects are judged” (Higgott, 2006, 23).

Moreover, it was quite evident that while functionalist and neo-functionalist theories en visaged “spill-over” from low to high politics, regionalism in the non-Western world showed quite the reverse pattern. As Andrew Axline (1977, 103) points out: “Rather than a logic which moves from rather modest beginnings of economic integration to incremen tally higher levels of political cooperation, the logic of integration among developing countries foresees little likelihood of success if integration is undertaken at relatively low levels, and a greater possibility of success only if a relatively high level of political inte gration is undertaken at the outset.” In the absence of political understanding and due to the prevalence of high level of conflict among the regional actors, Third World integration efforts led to conditions quite opposite to those that integration theories had hoped for. A very interesting finding supporting this argument came from Constantine Vaitsos’ wide- ranging survey in 1978 of regional integration in the Third World. The study concluded that one of the major intended effects of integration, trade liberalization, could actually lead to strife among the participants. New investment and activities prompted by market integration gradually gravitate towards the zones of countries which already have larger markets and a more developed physical and human infrastructure. As a result, “trade lib eralization could accentuate inter-country polarization effects … [which] could in turn create serious economic and political conflicts among the member states” (Vaitsos, 1978, 746).

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(p. 116)

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Some might argue that the European regional integration theories were at least able to specify the scope conditions the presence or absence of which could help the analyst to predict the success or failure of regional groups. But this view, while not without merit, has certain limitations. For one thing, it does not take into account the fundamental dif ferences in the foundational motivations and goals of regionalism in the non-Western world. For integration theories such as neo-functionalism the goal of regionalism was to achieve integration, defined by Ernst Haas, in his major work, The Uniting of Europe,

(p. 117) as “a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are per suaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national
states” (Haas, 1968, 16). By contrast, the foundational goal of most regional groups in the post-colonial non-Western world was autonomy, defined as the protection and preserva tion of state sovereignty and developing resilience against external intervention, whether from within or outside the region. Zartman (1971, 386) defines autonomy as a condition in which regional “actions and responses predominate over external influences.” Hence integration schemes that override sovereignty through the development of supranational institutions, which was the hallmark of neo-functionalist theory, were deemed antithetical to the founding goals of non-Western regionalisms. For the latter, seeking autonomy meant giving priority to developing intra-regional norms and collective postures to mini mize mutual interference and external intervention in the region.

Moreover, the reasons cited for the failure of integration efforts (and theories) in the de veloping world often focus on negative factors, such as instability, pervasiveness of pover ty, and regime paternalism. But this obscures the positive forces such as the norms of de colonization and nationalism which might have affected regional institution-building and integration in the post-colonial world (Acharya, 2009). While nationalism and sovereignty were implicated for the two World Wars in Europe, they were regarded as legitimate aspi rations and moral imperatives in the post-colonial world.

To reiterate, neo-functionalism can tell us something about why there was no integration or high degree of institutionalization of the EU variety in Asia or Latin America because of the absence of conditions like democracy, market capitalism, and interest groups in these regions. But it cannot tell us why regionalisms in Asia, Latin America, and Africa developed with fundamentally different goals (keeping, rather than bypassing, sovereign ty) in the first place, and in a strikingly different manner (with much less institutionaliza tion) from the EU. Nor could it capture the differences in goals and methods among the various regionalisms in the developing world. Local conditions, determinants, and process dynamics matter (Acharya and Johnston, 2007).

Hence, a theory of regionalism more suitable for the non-Western world (while acknowl edging variations and differences within this category) might give more emphasis on re gional autonomy, as opposed to regional integration. It could be developed around the fol lowing elements. First, it had as its foundational goal the preservation of state sovereign ty and limiting extra-regional influence and manipulation in regional affairs. In political and security terms, this meant ensuring non-interference in the internal affairs of each

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state within a regional group, and non-intervention by extra-regional actors in regional af fairs (such as superpower intervention in regional conflicts during the Cold War). Second, in economic terms, it prioritizes developmental goals or developmental regionalism (Chapter 17 by Bruszt and Palestrini, this volume), including the achievement of greater national self-reliance, over market integration. Third, it requires less formal or legalistic institutions and processes which might undercut sovereignty and non-intervention, such as a supranational bureaucracy and binding targets of integration and formal arbitration or dispute settlement mechanisms. Fourth, (p. 118) the spill-over logic operates in such a way that initial political will and cooperation is a prerequisite for undertaking economic integration, exactly the reverse of what neo-functionalism envisages.

One might argue that the differences between the foundational objectives of EEC/EU re gionalism and regionalism in the non-Western world are overstated. This is especially so if one takes into account the argument advanced by Milward (1992) that the EEC/EU project is not about eroding sovereignty but about the pooling of sovereignty. In this view, the European nation-states agreed to pool and delegate national sovereignty rights in the EU to gain domestic autonomy—being able to adopt public policies at the European level which would be blocked by particularistic interests at the national level. Moravcsik (1994) took up the argument when he claimed that European integration strengthens the state. And Kohler-Koch (1996) referred to the phenomenon as the “strength of weakness.”

Such pooling of sovereignty is also present in the non-Western world where regional bod ies were created to maximize the collective bargaining power of states, especially in the context of their post-colonial political, diplomatic, and economic weaknesses and vulnera bilities vis-à-vis the developed nations. Indeed, groups such as the OAU, the Arab League, ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and ECOWAS to varying degrees were meant to advance the collective bargaining position of their members in security, econom ic, and diplomatic areas. For example, a major purpose behind the emergence of ASEAN was to give its members a chance to develop a collective voice in security matters in a re gion otherwise dominated by the Western powers as well as Asian ones like China and In dia, and engage in collective bargaining over the price of natural resources (Chapter 11 by Jetschke and Katada, this volume). But even here, there is a key difference between EEC/EU regionalism and that of non-Western groups like ASEAN. In the former case, the pooling of sovereignty might have “rescued” or even strengthened the nation-state do mestically, but it did require a weakening of a member state externally in relation to oth er members. It did entail a retreat from sovereignty. This was not the case with groupings in the non-Western world like ASEAN which did join hands to advance common interests when and where they deemed fit, but maintained strict sovereignty barriers and non-in tervention in relation to each other.

The EU and non-Western regionalisms differed not only over the divergent foundational rationales, e.g. taming sovereignty versus preserving it, but also due to differing objec tives of economic regionalism, such as the emphasis on trade liberalization and market expansion in Western Europe versus self-reliance and developmental regionalism in the non-Western world. Axline has argued that Third World regional integration schemes of

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the 1960s and 1970s were in reality conceived largely as a strategy of economic develop ment (Axline, 1977). In this sense, regional economic cooperation aimed at promoting economic development and attaining a measure of collective economic self-reliance (al though the latter proved to be especially difficult to realize) was more commonplace in non-Western regionalisms than the comprehensive market integration approach found in Europe (Shaw, 1989). “Developmental regionalism” has been an important feature of non- Western regionalisms, especially in ASEAN (Nesadurai, (p. 119) 2003), but also in the case of ECOWAS and SADC (Chapter 17 by Bruszt and Palestini, this volume).

Aside from economic integration, differences between European and other regionalisms extend to security goals and approaches. In particular, NATO-type collective defense mechanisms proved to be scarce in the non-Western world, especially in Asia (Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002; Acharya, 2009, 2011). This is explained not only by differing secu rity challenges, such as the primacy of domestic security concerns in the non-Western world, compared to the importance attached to external security challenges in Western Europe. Avoidance of collective defense was also explained by normative preferences, es pecially because defense and security cooperation in the non-Western world often en tailed increased reliance on outside powers, which in turn would fuel competitive great power intervention in the region and loss of regional autonomy. Differences between West European and non-Western regionalisms are also explained by gaps in resources and ca pabilities, which were much scarcer in the non-Western regions than in the EU which is a group of developed, affluent nations.

The literature on regionalism has progressed rapidly since the end of the Cold War. New er perspectives, such as “new regionalism” (Chapter 2 by Söderbaum, this volume) and the application of constructivism to study norm diffusion (Chapter 5 by Risse, this vol ume) and community-building (Chapter 24 by Checkel, this volume) at the regional level have done much to broaden the theoretical literature on regionalism. But even these ad vances suffer from doses of Eurocentrism, and have not adequately captured the voices and experiences of regionalisms around the world.

“New regionalism” (Chapter 2 by Söderbaum, this volume) is an eclectic body of litera ture that includes both mainstream and critical approaches to international relations. It contains a specific understanding of regionalism, but it is hardly a theory. Its major strength is a significant broadening of the scope of what is to be investigated. It covers a whole range of phenomena that were previously ignored by theories of regionalism, such as non-state actors and informal flows. If theory is understood as a statement of cause- and-effect relationship, then new regionalism falls short. To be sure, a causal theory was not what its proponents intended. New regionalism’s contribution has to be seen in that context. But new regionalism is somewhat EU-centric. As the foundational text of new re gionalism, published in 1994 from a pilot project of the Helsinki-based UNU/Wider (Unit ed Nations University, World Institute for Development Economics Research) on “regional cooperation and neo-regionalism,” put it, “Europe represents the most advanced regional arrangement the world has seen, and it will consequently serve as our paradigm for the new regionalism in the sense that its conceptualization eagerly draws on empirical obser

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vations of the European process” (Hettne and Inotai, 1994, 12). This was of course a pre

liminary conceptualization, and should not be held as the sole basis of how the concept

evolved. Later, new regionalism literature became more varied. But much of its influence

can still be found in Europe, mainly because of the availability of funding (a large chunk

of it is from the EU, examples being the GARNET and GREEN networks) and scholarly in

(p. 120) The other major development that broadened the scope of regionalism studies was the advent of constructivism. While the new regionalism literature was inspired by a critique of formal regionalism, the constructivist approach to regionalism (which was not wholly distinct from, but overlapped with, new regionalism) was motivated by a desire to counter the rationalist and materialist assumptions of previous theories, especially neo- functionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism (Chapter 3 by Börzel, this volume). The con structivist turn in international relations (IR) theory, especially after the end of the Cold War, brought in ideational and normative elements to the study of regionalism and intro duced the notion of socialization, in marked contrast to the neo-functionalist emphasis on “the instrumental motives of actors,” which takes “self-interest for granted and relies on it for delineating actor perceptions” (Haas, 1973, 117).

Constructivism not only gives ideas, norms, and identity a crucial role in shaping region alism, or how and why regionalism comes about. It also provides an ideational and norma tive yardstick for measuring the outcome of regionalism. The success or failure of region al institutions can be judged in terms of their ability to create, localize, and propagate norms rather than on the basis of their material indicators like free trade or collective de fense.

Hence, it is hardly surprising that constructivism has been far more popular in studying regionalism outside Europe than other general IR theories, such as neo-liberal institution alism (for an application of a neo-liberal and new institutionalism perspective to Asia, see Kahler, 1994; Haggard, 2011). By acknowledging that regionalism could be driven by ideational and inter-subjective factors rather than purely rationalist ones and judged in terms of normative outcomes rather than purely material ones, constructivism has en couraged new ways of studying regionalism in the non-Western world. This includes Southeast Asian, Latin American, Arab, and African regionalisms where culture and iden tity could be driving factors, and whose contributions could be mainly in the normative domain, while their formal regional institutions remain outside of the scope conditions of rationalist theories such as neo-functionalism (Acharya, 2009).

Yet, the turn to constructivism in the study of regionalism is most pronounced in Europe. It could also be seen as a natural response among scholars to the progress of West Euro pean regionalism, especially with the advent of the EU with a single market, a common currency, and political-security initiatives that led some to expect the emergence of a “Eu ropean identity” and the projection of the EU’s “normative power” (Chapter 9 by Schim melfennig, this volume). Hence much of the advance made in the study of regionalism through the deployment of constructivist concepts and categories has occurred with ref

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erence to European and transatlantic institutions, such as the EU and NATO. Nonethe less, other scholars have applied constructivism to regionalisms in Europe, Asia, and oth er parts of the world. (Examples of constructivist writings on European and non-Euro pean regionalisms include Adler and Barnett, 1998; Barnett, 1995; Acharya, 2001, 2004, 2009; Christiansen et al., 2001; Hemmer and Katzenstein, 2002; Risse, 2004; Checkel, 2005; Fabbri, 2005; Kacowicz, 2005).

Despite offering a closer fit with the non-Western world, constructivism also suffers from biases. One of its key foundational texts, Wendt’s A Social Theory of International (p. 121) Politics (1999), has little to say about the non-Western world. Furthermore, constructivist approaches to norm diffusion (Chapter 5 by Risse, this volume), especially the first wave of that literature, privileged the moral cosmopolitanism of transnational Western norm entrepreneurs, and gave little recognition to the normative structures and agencies in the non-Western world (Acharya, 2009). Constructivism and liberalism overlap considerably when it comes to the study of regional institutions. In developing the concept of security communities, constructivism has essentially appropriated what was originally a liberal ap proach, namely transactionalism, developed by Karl Deutsch and his associates (Deutsch et al., 1957). Constructivist perspectives on regional security communities argue that their formation requires a convergence of liberal-democratic values, thereby making the concept less applicable to the non-Western world. This of course is debatable, as there are examples of community-building among non-liberal states founded upon shared goals such as development, security, and regional autonomy (Acharya, 2001).

The foregoing has argued that the various frameworks of regionalism that have emerged after World War II and found expression through a particular type of regional organiza tion in Europe and the Atlantic have all proved to be more successful in the West than in the non-Western world. In general, the non-Western world has not been able to duplicate Eurocentric models. But this does not mean regionalism in the non-Western world has been inconsequential or irrelevant. Far from it, regionalism of various kinds and address ing various issue-areas continues to thrive outside Europe. The changing global political and economic environment has brought to the fore many challenges which call for greater emphasis on regional cooperation. Conversely, these challenges have widened the range of tasks that existing regional groups and arrangements can perform. Today, there is a growing recognition that regional cooperation need not follow a single model derived from the European experience. The reorientation of regional groupings towards new transnational dangers has not been a case of simple diffusion of European models and ap proaches to the world at large. This is a powerful reason why we need to address the challenge of constructing a global history of regionalism and developing approaches that capture its multiple and diverse forms.

One perspective that might help us move in that direction is the concept of “regional world.” Its origin can be traced to a now concluded project at the University of Chicago. It was concerned with the contemporary challenges facing area studies. It was about re gions, not regionalisms per se. But it has a significant relevance for the study of regional ism in international relations. The goal of the Chicago project was to offer a new “concep

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tual, strategic and practical … approach to area studies.” The project sought to move area studies from an approach “driven by conceptions of geographical, civilizational and cultural coherence,” or “trait geographies,” towards “process geographies” that take a more dynamic and interactive view of regions (and hence regionalisms). Regions or areas are not “objective clusters of cartographic, material or cultural facts.” The “process geog raphy” perspective would imply “new ways to approach both space and time in relation to ‘areas’ with space becoming more flexible and porous and time less sequential and cumulative” (Regional Worlds Project, n.d. a; b, 23).

(p. 122) Thus articulated, the “regional world” perspective shares with “new regionalism” and constructivism the view that regions are not fixed geographic and cultural entities, but are dynamic and socially constructed ones that can take on the quality of imagined communities. To a much greater extent than new regionalism, the “regional world” per spective highlights the global heritage of regionalism and captures the multiple, diverse, but cross-cutting patterns of regionalism in global order.

Moreover, the “regional world” perspective is not just about the internal dynamics of re gions, but also about how regions relate to each other and to the construction and man agement of global order. Regions are neither wholly self-contained entities, nor purely ex tensions of global dynamics. “Multiple regions overlap and contradict one another to form complex webs of power, interaction and imagination that are constantly in

motion” (Ranchod-Nilsson, 2000, 8). Regional worlds not only self-organize their internal economic, political, and cultural space, they also produce their own image and construc tions of other regions and the global space in general. Regions “are not just places, but are also locations for the production of other world-pictures, which also need to be part of our sense of these other worlds” (Appadurai, 1997, 6).

The “regional world” perspective thus recognizes the openness of regions to outside influ ences. It has special relevance for developing a general theory of regionalism that not on ly captures the diversity of regionalisms around the world, but also the interactions and mutual learning among them. This aspect may seem similar to the concept of “inter-re gionalism” that has been popular in EU studies, but much of that discourse has been markedly a one-way street, covering the relationship between the EU and other regions. It examines the use of inter-regionalism as an EU foreign policy tool (Chapter 26 by Ribeiro Hoffmann, this volume; Börzel and Risse, 2009; Baert et al., 2014), while paying little attention to the possibilities of mutual learning among different regions in the world including what the EU might learn from other regions. Hänggi, Roloff, and Rüland (2006) offer a wider perspective, transregionalism, which looks at non-EU relationships such as East Asia and Latin America and North America and Asia. The “regional world” approach argues that the two-way projection of ideas and institutions can be applied to all regions of the world. It shares with the “new regionalism” literature a broader framework for in vestigating regionalism that moves away from formal institutions and examines the role of both state and non-state actors. It is less EU-centric and offers a greater sense of

“open regionalism” (in terms of interactions and mutual learning among regions) while

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calling for more in-depth knowledge of individual regions that is the hallmark of area studies approaches.

Emerging Regionalisms: Convergence, Diversity, and Diffusion

Even with a cursory glance, it is not difficult to find striking differences between the EU and non-Western regionalisms and regional institutions. Non-Western regional (p. 123) groups are generally more sovereignty-bound, showing a far greater addiction to the non- intervention principle (although this is changing and there are differences among non- Western groups on this, as will be discussed later). They feature smaller bureaucracies and show a greater preference for informal processes, consensus (as opposed to majority vote) decision-making, and non-binding outcomes. Recent attempts to explain these dif ferences (Katzenstein, 2005; Acharya and Johnston, 2007) have further attested to the limits of applying European approaches to the rest of the world.

Not only is there variation between West European and non-Western regionalism; there are also differences among regionalisms in different parts of the non-Western world. His torically, different regionalisms have laid special stress on developing norms and modali ties in distinctive areas, reflecting local context and need, e.g. Latin America’s develop ment of the non-intervention norm, Asia’s anti-collective defense norm, and Africa’s spe cial emphasis on the inviolability of colonially imposed boundaries. While these old differ ences are now less salient, new variations are emerging. African regional institutions, such as the African Union and ECOWAS, are far more receptive to humanitarian interven tion (hence the pooling and delegation of sovereignty) than Asia’s. Asia’s regional bodies do not take democracy promotion as a serious norm, in the manner of the OAS (Chapter 21 by Pevehouse, this volume). The Arab League lags seriously behind its counterparts in Asia and sub-regional groups in Africa and Latin America in economic regionalism and se curity cooperation. East Asian economic regionalism (development, trade, finance, and production networking) is well ahead of economic regionalism in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. East Asia is also marked by a higher degree of regionalization as de fined in this Handbook (Chapter 1 by Börzel and Risse, this volume). This distinguishes East Asia not only from other non-EU regions, but also from the EU. Whereas in the latter strong regional organizations structured the regional integration process, in East Asia re gionalization, which refers here mainly to trade and production networks forged by eth nic Chinese groups and multinational corporations, preceded and led the formation of for mal regional institutions, especially economic institutions such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Economic Community (Chapter 11 by Jetschke and Katada, this volume). Against this backdrop, a broader framework for explaining the evo lution and judging the performance of regionalism is warranted; one cannot judge them in terms of whether and to what extent they conform to the EU or any other single model of integration.

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Regionalism is a constantly changing and evolving phenomenon and has seen major de velopments in the past decades in response to the end of the Cold War, the rise and fall of the “unipolar moment,” the proliferation of transnational challenges (such as climate change, terrorism, financial volatility, etc.), and other shifts in global power and norma tive structures. It is a fair question whether theories and approaches to regionalism de veloped during an earlier period and with a limited applicability beyond their immediate regional context, have kept up with the changes reshaping world politics today.

(p. 124) Not only have regional groups, formal and informal, proliferated in the non-West ern world, including in areas such as Asia which had previously proved inhospitable to them, but the purpose and functions of regionalism have expanded. Alongside this the scope of regionalism, or the nature of challenges and tasks to which regionalism is ad dressed, has expanded considerably. Regionalism is no longer geared mainly towards trade liberalization, or managing inter-state conflict, as was the case with the original re gional groups in the post-war era. It now serves a variety of challenges, such as internal conflicts, environmental degradation, migration and refugee flows, promotion and protec tion of human rights and democracy, counter-terrorism, etc. (see Chapter 14 by Kacowicz and Press-Barnathan, Chapter 19 by Haas, Chapter 20 by Lavenex et al., and Chapter 21 by Pevehouse, this volume). This expansion in numbers and functions provides another powerful reason for rethinking traditional theories and approaches to regionalism, which developed in the context of strategic security and economic integration.

The context and conditions of regional cooperation and integration around the world have also changed. Many countries and regions outside the West have seen impressive capital ist economic development and growing interdependence and democratization. It is thus worth considering whether the non-applicability of regional integration theories in the de veloping world might change, since they undercut the barriers identified by Nye and Haas. But the arguments against such convergence remain powerful. It is clear that in the one region where capitalist development has been most pronounced, East Asia, illib eral or authoritarian politics remains deeply entrenched. And even forms of capitalism vary; East Asia’s development model better fits the notion of state or state-led capitalism, which is both a product of illiberal politics and supportive of it. Some degree of conver gence of normative underpinnings and institutional forms between European and other— Asian, African, and Latin American—regionalisms is possible, such as the renaming of the Organization of African Unity as the African Union or ASEAN’s adoption of a Charter and expansion of its secretariat. But these emulations are less substantive than claimed, and likely to be superficial at least in the short and medium term. Moreover, such conver gence is more likely to happen through norm and institutional localization, rather than straightforward emulation and mimicking of the European model (Chapter 5 by Risse, this volume). Any attempt to develop a universal theory of regionalism cannot be a matter of “one size fits all,” but has to take into account the enduring diversity among regions and regionalisms.

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At the same time, it might be argued that institutional developments in Europe have widened the gap existing between EU and non-Western regionalisms. The very advanced state of EU regionalism undermines its claim to present a model for the rest of the world. Indeed, it might be argued that the gap between EU and Third World regional institutions has widened to the point where the latter can no longer realistically expect to emulate the former, even if it admires and is inspired by the former. Hence, Europe could be an in spiration, but not a model, for non-Western regionalisms. To compound matters, the re cent crisis in the Eurozone might have lessened the prestige and credibility of the EU as a universal model, and may even lead to the EU adopting a less integrationist approach that has more in common with non-Western regionalisms – a form of convergence.

(p. 125) Conclusion

Given that the proliferation of regional groups around the world and the expansion of their tasks have introduced a greater variety and diversity to the design and operation of regional bodies, is a universal theory of regionalism possible? The answer is clearly no if one accepts the standard definition of universalism as “applying to all.” The aforemen tioned divide between the EU’s stress on integration, and much of the developing world’s focus on autonomy, may be getting a little blurred thanks to the rise of transnational chal lenges (which forces all states to dilute the principle of state sovereignty) and new norms of humanitarian intervention, but it is unlikely to disappear anytime soon.

One key task for the study of comparative regionalism is to develop theories and ap proaches that capture and explain the diversity of regions rather than obscure them and assume a universal pattern of development. One way to cope with diversity may lie in specifying the scope conditions that make certain types of regionalism present in some regions and absent in others. Here, the older regional integration theories, which, as mentioned earlier, explained why EU-style integration did not work in the developing world, might have some use (Chapter 3 by Börzel, this volume). But they need to be sup plemented with new insights, including those of “new regionalism” and “regional world” perspectives with their broader framework of goals and forms of regionalism including the interaction between the outside forces and local elements (especially in the “regional world” perspective), as well as constructivist explanations of norm and institutional diffu sion. Some conditions for regionalism specified by the older integration theories, such as democratization and market economies, may be present everywhere. But unless one is a true believer in the “global village” assuming uniformity in the nature and institutions of democracy and capitalism everywhere, it is better to see regionalism in terms of different political, economic, and normative conditions in different parts of the world. Here, theo ries that may be more helpful would be those which explain the processes of diffusion of ideas and institutions, including, but not limited to, “localization and subsidiarity” theo ries. These theories pay ample attention to the scope conditions that help to explain how and why the diffusion of ideas and institutions might succeed or fail (Acharya, 2004, 2009, 2011).

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These perspectives identify decolonization and nationalism as the key scope conditions explaining why regionalism and regional orders vary between the EU and the regions of the developing world, just as democracy and interest group politics were important condi tions for European integration theory, especially neo-functionalism. While decolonization may be a thing of the past, post-colonial nationalism remains alive as a force shaping the foreign policies of developing countries. The key scope condition for localization is build ing congruence between outside ideas and institutions (such as EU-style institutionaliza tion), and local cognitive priors (such as non-intervention). This ensures that the diffusion of institutional models only occurs (p. 126) selectively and does not totally supplant exist ing ideas and approaches. As an example, despite recent claims about an EU-style institu tionalization occurring in ASEAN with the adoption of an ASEAN Charter, these changes have “not led to a comprehensive and systematic copying of EU institutions by ASEAN. Rather, member states have acted selectively in line with their ‘cognitive priors’ about state sovereignty” (Jetschke and Murray, 2012, 174). This is consistent with the expecta tions of the “localization” perspective. The identification of scope conditions would also address other methodological issues in comparative regionalism having to do with the rel ative merit of deductive and inductive approaches. I agree with those who argue that there is a need to acknowledge “the constant interplay” between deductive and inductive approaches (De Lombaerde, 2015). I also believe, however, that having some empirically determined sense of the scope conditions would make the choice of theoretical frame work more meaningful.

To conclude, a general theory of regionalism, if it is possible at all, should not be based on a singular or specific model of regionalism applying to all. Instead, approaches to the study of comparative regionalism should capture a world of overlapping diversity under pinning a genuinely pluralistic conception of global order which recognizes both the inde pendence and interdependence of regions, and gives more play to the role of local region alisms in borrowing and diffusing ideas and institutions of regionalism. To develop such a framework remains a critical but as yet unrealized challenge for comparative regionalism.

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